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The Commerce Power and
Congressional Mandates
Dan T. Coenen*
ABSTRACT
In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, a five-Justice majority concluded that the commerce power did not support enactment
of the so-called "individualmandate," which imposes a penalty on many persons who fail to buy health insurance. That ruling is sure to spark challenges
to other federal laws on the theory that they likewise mandate individuals or
entities to take certain actions. Federallaws founded on the commerce power,
for example, require mine operators to provide workers with safety helmets
and (at least as a practicalmatter) require mine workers to wear them. Some
analysts will say that laws of this kind are distinguishablefrom the health care
mandate because they reach only actors who have injected themselves into
commerce by engaging in mining. There is a problem with this distinction,
however, because the health care mandate itself does not apply to everyone.
Instead, it takes aim only at citizens who inject themselves into commerce to
such an extent that they generate a minimum annual income.
In this Article, I seek to untangle the Court's new anti-mandateprinciple.
I suggest that future cases implicating this principle will present two central
questions. First,courts will have to decide whether the challenged law embodies a mandate. Second, if it does, they will have to determine whether that
mandate is sustainableunder the commerce power, notwithstandingthe limits
laid down in the health care case. I argue that answering this second question
will require consideration of four analytical touchstones-what I call (1) escapability, (2) relatedness, (3) invasiveness, and (4) policy sensitivity. The operation of these four factors-each of which presents its own analytical
complexities-signals the difficulties that courts will face in future mandate
cases. And the presence of these difficulties highlights the need for the sort of
structured analysis I offer here.
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INTRODUCTION

In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius

("NFIB"),1 the Supreme Court upheld the so-called "individual mandate," which subjects most Americans to a penalty administered
through the taxing system if they do not maintain health insurance. 2
The government's defense of that law, however, did not produce an
unalloyed victory. Four members of the Court-Justices Ginsburg,
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan-voted to uphold the measure as a
proper exercise of both the taxing power and the commerce power.3
Four other members of the Court-Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas,
and Alito (hereinafter the "joint opinion writers")-deemed it unsustainable on either basis.4 In a determinative opinion, Chief Justice
Roberts steered a middle course, concluding that the provision was a
valid exercise of Congress's power to tax 5 but not a permissible exercise of Congress's power under the Commerce and Necessary and
Proper Clauses. 6
1
2
3
4

Nat'1 Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
See id. at 2580, 2608.
See id. at 2609 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See id. at 2642 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting) [hereinafter joint

dissent].
5 See id. at 2600 (majority opinion).
6 See id. at 2591-93 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
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NFIB has already triggered a search for new theories to constrain
federal legislative power,7 and a key source of such theories is not
hard to spot: It lies in the five-Justice ruling that rejected the government's commerce power argument. The Court's handling of that argument is important, because the Commerce Clause and Necessary
and Proper Clause support a vast array of federal laws-laws, for example, that ensure workplace safety, establish minimum product-quality standards, govern banks and public corporations, criminalize
market-related activity, and protect our environment. 8 Many of these
laws also impose mandates, or at least arguably do so.
In this Article, I explain why the Court's ruling in NFIB raises
constitutional problems for a variety of measures founded on the commerce power. In one sense, this observation lacks originality, because
many observers have predicted that NFIB may portend judicial retrenchment in the commerce power field.9 In another sense, however,
my message breaks new ground. Rather than offering only sound-bite
prognostications, I identify actual or potential federal laws that now
present constitutional difficulties in light of NFIB. The diversity of
these laws-ranging from criminal possession bans to prohibitions on
discrimination to public health measures to plant closing statutes (and
on and on)-leaves no doubt that efforts to leverage the Court's antimandate ruling will arise in many settings. Moreover, for two reasons,
the Court's broadening of the taxing power will not render its narrowing of the commerce power a matter of little practical concern, notwithstanding the suggestions of some to the contrary.10 First, many
7 See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, To Tax, To Spend, To Regulate, 126 HARV. L. REV. 83,
112-16 (2012) (considering the future impact of NFIB).
8 See generally DAN T. COENEN, Constitutional Law: The Commerce Clause 3, 30-31
(2004).
9 See, e.g., James B. Stewart, In Obama's Victory, A Loss for Congress, N.Y. TIMES, June
30, 2012, at B1 (noting that "conservatives and libertarians lost their legal battle" but "may have
won a bigger war"); Ilya Somin, Do the Court's Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper
Clause Rulings in the Individual Mandate Case Matter?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 29, 2012,
2:44 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2012/06/29/do-the-courts-commerce-clause-and-necessaryand-proper-clause-rulings-in-the-individual-mandate-case-matter/ ("[F]ive justices were willing
to endorse a strong substantive limit on these [commerce] powers. That is both symbolically
significant and a potential signal for future cases."). See generally Robert J. Pushaw, Jr. & Grant

S. Nelson, The Likely Impact of National Federation on Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 40

PEPP. L. REV. 975, 978 (2013) (noting views of some conservatives that NFIB was a stage-setter
for "significantly curtailing Congress's power" in "the long run," and also observing that "the
four liberal Justices and their scholarly defenders echoed that worry"). For additional commentary along these lines, see infra note 15.
10 See, e.g., Robert N. Weiner, Much Ado: The Potential Impact of the Supreme Court
Decision Upholding the Affordable Care Act, in THE HEALTH CARE CASE 69, 75 (Nathaniel
Persily et al. eds., 2013) ("Particularly given that the Court has now provided a road map to
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existing laws were put in place solely under the commerce power, so
that no argument for sustaining them under the taxing power will be
available if and when they are challenged." Second, it is always politically difficult for Congress to pass laws under the taxing power. 12
Thus, with regard to any potential new law-whether designed to cure
defects in an already existing statute or to launch a previously untried
legal program-the anti-mandate principle will exert a constraining
influence.' 3
The practical significance of the Court's anti-mandate principle
suggests the need to construct an overarching methodology for its application in future cases. In this Article, I propose one. Under my
methodology, decisionmakers confronted with anti-mandate arguments should undertake a two-part inquiry. First, they should ask
whether the challenged law imposes a mandate. Second, if it does,
they should evaluate whether that mandate runs afoul of the teaching
avoid constitutional infirmity by proceeding under the taxing power, Congress should have little
reason to enact any provision remotely akin to a mandate under the Commerce Clause.").
11 See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 301-05 (1964) (addressing the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S.
241, 253-57 (1964) (same).
12 See, e.g., Brief for State Respondents on the Minimum Coverage Provision at 2, U.S.
Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398) [hereinafter
State Brief] ("Legislation, especially legislation raising taxes, is supposed to be difficult to
pass.

. .

. [I1f taxes can be disguised as mandates . . . the normal democratic process cannot

perform its vital and intended limiting function."); Weiner, supra note 10, at 81 (noting "an
axiom of American politics-people do not like to pay taxes"). Indeed, this political reality
played an important role in the crafting of the individual mandate itself. See Charles Fried, The
June Surprises: Balls, Strikes, and the Fog of War, in THE HEALTH CARE CASE, supra note 10, at
51, 58 ("Congress had deliberately and on evident political grounds declined to designate the
mandate and the consequences for noncompliance a tax . . . ."); Michael J. Graetz & Jerry L.
Mashaw, ConstitutionalUncertainty and the Design of Social Insurance: Reflections on the ACA
Case, in THE HEALTH CARE CASE, supra note 10, at 300, 310 (noting that the "allergic reaction
of congressmen . . . to the 'T' word .. . caused the ACA 'tax' to be presented as a 'penalty'"); see
also Jack Balkin, Teaching Materialsfor NFIB v. Sebelius, BALKINIZATION (July 17, 2012, 8:50
AM), http:/Ibalkin.blogspot.com/2012/07/teaching-materials-for-nfib-v-sebelius.html
(noting
"that the Democrats were ... afraid to call [the health care bill] a tax" and thus "fought the
entire litigation with one hand tied behind their back").
13 There is another point, too. Chief Justice Roberts upheld the tax imposed on failing to
acquire insurance only because it was not so onerous that it foreclosed individuals from having a
meaningful choice with regard to whether to obtain coverage or pay the tax. See NFIB, 132 S.
Ct. 2566, 2595-96 (2012) (majority opinion). As a result, it may well be that Congress's taxing
power may not in the future provide a big enough stick to induce individuals to engage in forms
of behavior that Congress in fact seeks to mandate. See Randy E. Barnett, Who Won the
ObarnacareCase?, in THE HEALTH CARE CASE, supra note 10, at 17, 25 ("Suppose that Congress were now to . . . decide to greatly increase the 'tax' on the status of failing to have health
insurance. Would law professors dismiss a constitutional challenge to these measures as 'frivolous'? I doubt it.").
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of NFIB. In the pages that follow, I explain how four key factors will
press for attention as this second inquiry unfolds-factors that I call
escapability, relatedness, invasiveness, and policy sensitivity. At the
heart of this project lies the idea that our law will profit if courts bring
these considerations into the light. My concern is that, if courts fail to
do so, these factors will nonetheless exert an influence in these kinds
of cases. Put another way, the four-factor analysis offered here-or
something like it-will operate either in the open or in the shadows.
For this reason, a studied assessment of these factors is a matter worthy of close consideration.
My analysis of the anti-mandate principle is set forth in six parts.
In Part I, I outline the Court's treatment of the commerce power issue
in NFIB, thus setting the stage for an evaluation of its future effects.
In Part II, I introduce my two-part test for applying the anti-mandate
principle, identifying four factors that courts should consider at the
second stage. In Part III, I direct attention to the subset of cases in
which the mandate label most readily applies-namely, cases that involve the imposition of affirmative duties that are inescapable. In
Part IV, I turn to cases in which the mandate label applies more
loosely because the duties imposed by law are conditional in character. In Part V, I touch on a range of new problems that NFIB's antimandate principle has raised. And, in Part VI, I explain why judges
should apply this principle with extreme caution as a general matter.
Some observers have claimed that the Supreme Court's treatment of the commerce power issue in NFIB was so narrow that it will
have little impact in future cases.14 Others, however, have issued
14 See, e.g., Weiner, supra note 10, at 69 (viewing "the legal ruling upholding the individual
mandate" as "largely inconsequential in the evolution of constitutional law"); A. Christopher
Bryant, Constitutional Newspeak: Learning to Love the Affordable Care Act Decision, 39 J.
LEGIs. 15, 37 (2012-2013) (suggesting that future uses of NFIB's anti-mandate principle will be
"exceedingly rare"); Bradley W. Joondeph, The Affordable Care Act and the Commerce Power:
Much Ado About (Nearly) Nothing, J. HEALTH & LIFE Sci. L., Feb. 2013, at 1, 6 (claiming that
the Court's Commerce Clause ruling "will not operate as a meaningful constraint on Congress's
future lawmaking"); Aziz Huq, The Nation: Threats in the Health Care Ruling, NPR (July 2,
2012, 8:41 AM), http://www.npr.org/2012/07/02/156104486/the-nation-threats-in-the-health-care);
ruling ("[T]his new activity/inactivity distinction will not touch most federal regulation ....
Steven D. Schwinn, Did Chief Justice Roberts Craft a New, More Limited Commerce Clause?,
CONsTITrONAL LAW PROF BLOG (June 29, 2012), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/conlaw/
(suggesting
2012/06/did-chief-justice-roberts-craft-a-new-more-limited-commerce-clause.htm
that "this restriction [on regulating inactivity] will have no effect on congressional authority");
Drew Singer & Terry Baynes, Analysis: Legal Eagles Redefine Healthcare Winners, Losers,
REUTERs (July 3, 2012, 6:32 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/03/us-usa-healthcarecourt-idUSBRE8621A 520120703 (quoting Geoffrey Stone as predicting that the health care
ruling "won't have much impact [because the conservatives] won an argument, but it's not an
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warnings that the majority may have put in place a doctrinal Trojan
Horse, cleverly constructed to facilitate a down-the-road assault on
key features of the Court's post-New Deal jurisprudence.15 Only time
will tell which of these views is more prescient. 16 One thing, however,
is clear right now: Both lawyers duty-bound to represent clients zealously and academic disciples of libertarianism and state autonomy will
work hard to forge from the Court's ruling new tools for cutting back
on congressional power.17 As a result, both judges and lawyers-with
the guidance of legal scholars-must begin to think carefully about
how NFIB's anti-mandate principle should apply in future cases.
argument that's likely to occur very often"); Laurence H. Tribe, fcis]Chief Justice Roberts
Comes into His Own and Saves the Court While Preventing a Constitutional Debacle, SCOTUSBLOG (June 28, 2012, 3:41 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/chief-justice-roberts-comesinto-his-own-and-saves-the-court-while-preventing-a-constitutional-debacle/ ("[T]he dubious action-inaction distinction endorsed by today's decision will likely do little to tie Congress's hands
going forward.").
15 See, e.g., Nathaniel Persily et al., Introduction to THE HEALTH CARE CASE, supra note
10, at 1, 5 (noting that some view the Court's ruling "as a long-term promise to conservatives");
Ilya Somin, The IndividualMandate and the ProperMeaning of "Proper," in THE HEALTH CARE
CASE, supra note 10, at 146, 147 ("[lIt is possible that the ruling will have a noteworthy impact in
curtailing future federal mandates."); id. at 161 ("Roberts's endorsement of the 'incidental powers' theory of propriety could have significant impact in the future, depending on the definition
of what counts as an independent power. . . ."). The potential for retrenchment is also suggested
by Justice Ginsburg's dissent. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2609 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (describing the majority's approach to the Commerce Clause as reflecting a
"crabbed reading" that is "stunningly retrogressive"); see also Pamela S. Karlan, Op-Ed., No
Respite for Liberals,N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2012, at SR1 ("The Supreme Court has given Americans
who care about economic and social justice a reason to worry this Fourth of July. The court's
guns have been loaded; it only remains to be seen whether it fires them."); David Bernstein, Is
This 1936?, SCOTUSBLOG (June 29, 2012, 9:32 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/is-this1936/ ("[Tlhe ACA litigation shows that ideas once deemed beyond the pale in 'respectable'
legal circles have now become mainstream among elite conservative lawyers. . . . [D]espite the
Obama administration's victory today, we may be on the cusp of [a] new and unpredictable era
in conservative jurisprudence."); Carrie Joh nson, How the Health Care Ruling Might Affect Civil
Rights, NPR (July 6, 2012, 2:39 PM), http://www.npr.org/2012/07/06/156378347/how-the-healthcare-ruling-might-affect-civil-rights (quoting Washington lawyer Robert Driscoll's observation
that the Commerce Clause "has traditionally formed the basis for many civil rights statutes [and
that] civil rights statutes generally would not have a taxing provision which could provide the
kind of save of the statute that happened for the health care case").
16 See David A. Strauss, Commerce Clause Revisionism and the Affordable Care Act, 2012
Sup. CT. REv. 1, 26 (emphasizing this point); see also infra note 64 (collecting authorities highlighting the uncertainty engendered by NFIB).
17 See, e.g., David Driesen, Health Care's New Commerce Clause: Implications for Environmental Law, CPRBLOG (June 29, 2012), http://www.progressivereform.org/CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog=38387E13-FBA5-918D-9C7E5OD3ADCFF23C (suggesting that "this new front on the
regulatory battlefield will likely enrich a lot of lawyers"); see also Mark A. Hall, Commerce
Clause Challenges to Health Care Reform, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1825, 1829 (2011) (suggesting that
the mandate to buy insurance is functionally indistinguishable from other congressional mandates already in force).
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NFIB

In NFIB, Chief Justice Roberts and the four joint opinion writers
came together on a critical point of law: Whatever authority Congress
might possess under the taxing power, it lacks authority under the
commerce power to attach a penalty to a citizen's failure to acquire
health insurance.' 8 To understand this ruling, it is helpful to begin
with the commerce power defense of the individual mandate put forward by the Solicitor General. He argued first that the mandate was a
critical piece of a broader statutory scheme, shaped by Congress in the
Affordable Care Act ("ACA"),19 to address far-reaching marketplace
problems in providing and paying for health care services. 20 The essential difficulty was that uninsured Americans were shifting massive
costs to insured Americans due to the widespread availability of unpaid-for health care services. 2 1 The ACA targeted this free-riding
problem by requiring insurers to sell their products at nondiscriminatory prices, including to buyers with preexisting conditions-thus creating the opportunity for much-expanded health insurance coverage. 22
These nondiscrimination rules, however, created problems of their
own because (1) inclusion in the insurance pool of high-risk purchasers threatened to drive up policy prices to unaffordable levels for
many buyers 23 and (2) a right to secure insurance regardless of preexisting conditions created an incentive for individuals not to obtain policies until they became ill.24 The individual mandate addressed these
problems by bringing healthy persons into the risk pool, while simultaneously stemming strategic delays in obtaining coverage. 25 For this
18 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2608 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2643 (joint dissent).
19 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
20 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2609-14 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Brief for Petitioners (Minimum Coverage Provision) at 17-18, 24-25, Dep't of Health & Human
Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398) [hereinafter Petitioners' Brief].
21 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2585 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (describing the "cost-shifting
problem" caused by individuals who secure free medical care despite their inability to pay and
lack of insurance, which results in "higher premiums" for policyholders).
22 See id. (outlining the operation of the "'guaranteed-issue' and 'community-rating' provisions"); Petitioners' Brief, supra note 20, at 10. Other means of addressing these problems involved the provision of subsidies for health insurance purchases and the broadening of coverage
through expansion of the Medicaid program. See 42 U.S.C. § 18071 (2012) (offering subsidies to
qualifying individuals); NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2581-82 (describing Medicaid expansion).
23 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2585 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
24 See id.

25 See id. at 2585; id. at 2613-15 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Petitioners' Brief, supra note 20, at 18. There was, according to defenders of the individual
mandate, another problem too: Any individual state would balk at expanding affordable coverage for the uninsured, even if that state viewed legislation to this effect in a positive light. See
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reason, the government argued, the provision was "necessary and
proper"-in the relevant legal sense of being "useful" or "convenient" 26-in rendering effective Congress's regulation of interstate
commerce via the ACA's concededly permissible nondiscrimination

rules.2 7
In addition, the Solicitor General contended that the individual
mandate reflected a logical extension of Congress's acknowledged authority to require payment for health care services with insurance proceeds, rather than by way of direct payment. 28 While acknowledging
that Congress could not force individuals to buy any product at any
time, the Solicitor General emphasized that every individual needs
health care services, often in the near term. As a result, so the argument went, Congress could require the purchase of health insurance
because every individual is, for practical purposes, operating in the
very market in which payment by way of insurance can be required. 29
Chief Justice Roberts did not question the underlying premises of
the government's arguments, including that the individual mandate
played a key role in allowing the ACA's nondiscrimination rules to
work. 30 Even so, he concluded that the mandate was not sustainable
under Congress's authority to deal with matters that substantially affect interstate commerce. 3' The key problem was textual. According
to the Chief Justice, the granted power to "regulate commerce" authorized the imposition of rules only on "existing commercial activity," 32 so that Congress could not invoke that power to "create"
commerce,3 3 including by "compel[ling] individuals not engaged in
commerce to purchase an unwanted product." 34 The Chief Justice
also relied on constitutional history, pointing in particular to James
Madison's observation in The FederalistNo. 45 that the Commerce
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2612 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This result
would take hold because any such reform would render the state a magnet for the needy from
other states, thus indicating that a workable solution to the health care crisis could be forged
only at the federal level. See id.
26 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 324-25, 367 (1819).
27 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2625-28 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
see also Strauss, supra note 16, at 7 (noting that the constitutionality of the guaranteed-issue and
community-rating provisions was not at issue in NFIB).
28 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2589-90 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.); Petitioners' Brief, supra note
20, at 18-19.
29 See Petitioners' Brief, supra note 20, at 35-36, 50-52.
30 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2585 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
31 See id. at 2588-91.
32 See id. at 2586-87.
33 See id. at 2586.
34 Id.
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Clause embodied an addition to federal powers "from which no apprehensions are entertained." 35 According to the Chief Justice, such a
peaceful, easy feeling about the clause was not reconcilable with reading it to alter "the relation between the citizen and the Federal Government" 3 6 in such a fundamental way that the "distinction between
doing something and doing nothing" would be obliterated.37 He added that the Solicitor General's regulating-includes-compelling theory
would permit Congress even to mandate "everyone to buy vegetables." 38 Nor was this difficulty removed by the government's claim
that all citizens were in effect active in the health care market because
of their inevitable need for health care services. 39 As he explained,
"[t]he phrase 'active in the market' cannot obscure the fact that most
of those regulated by the individual mandate are not currently engaged in any commercial activity involving health care." 4 0
The Chief Justice also rebuffed the government's claim that the
individual mandate constituted a "necessary and proper" measure for
implementing the ACA's nondiscrimination provisions. 4 1 The problem with this argument was that the mandate did not qualify as
"proper." 4 2 In particular, McCulloch v. Maryland43 indicated that the
Necessary and Proper Clause supports only the enactment of laws
"'incidental to"' an enumerated power, as opposed to "the exercise of
any 'great substantive and independent power[s].'"44 The individual
mandate failed this test because it was not "narrow in scope." 4 5
Rather, it purported to "vest[ ] Congress with the extraordinary ability
to create the necessary predicate to the exercise of [the commerce]
power." 46 Under the government's theory, the Chief Justice explained, "Congress could reach beyond the natural limit of its authority" because it would "[n]o longer . . . be limited to regulating under

the Commerce Clause those who by some preexisting activity bring
35

Id. at 2589 (quoting THE

FEDERALIST

No. 45, at 293 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter

ed., 1961)).
36 Id.
37

Id.

Id. at 2588.
See id. at 2590.
40 Id.
41 See id. at 2591-93.
42 See id. at 2592.
43 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
44 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2591 (alteration in original) (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
at 411, 418, 421).
45 Id. at 2592.
38

39

46

Id.
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themselves within the sphere of federal regulation." 4 7 In sum, the
minimum coverage provision could not be sustained under the Necessary and Proper Clause because it was not "'consist[ent] with the ...
spirit of the constitution,"' as required by McCulloch.4 8
The four joint opinion writers did not sign onto any portion of the
Chief Justice's opinion, but their commerce power reasoning tracked
many elements of his analysis. 4 9 Pointing to pre-1800 dictionary definitions,50 they agreed that the power to "regulate" commerce did not
permit Congress to "direct[] the creation of commerce." 5 For them,
the same conclusion found support in a functional considerationnamely, that recognizing a power to regulate the "failure to engage in
economic activity" would in effect "make mere breathing in and out
the basis for federal prescription." 52 Nor did it work for Congress to
use the "device of defining participants [in the health care market] to
include all those who will, later in their lifetime, probably purchase
the goods or services covered by the mandated insurance." 53 Reasoning by analogy, the joint opinion writers emphasized that "[a]ll of us
consume food"; yet "the mere fact that we . . . are thus, sooner or

later, participants in the 'market' for food, does not empower the
Government to say when and what we will buy." 54
The joint opinion writers also rejected efforts to defend the individual mandate as a necessary and proper means for implementing the
ACA's bans on discrimination. To be sure, the mandate helped make
those bans work.5 But Congress went too far when it "impressed into
service . . . healthy individuals who could be but are not customers of

the relevant industry, to offset the undesirable consequences" of commerce-regulating rules. 56 That assertion of authority had to fail, because otherwise Congress could control "a field so limitless" that it
would transform the Commerce Clause "into a general authority to
direct the economy."57 In short, "it must be activity affecting com47
48
49
50
51

Id.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421).
See id. at 2644-50 (joint dissent).

See id. at 2644.
Id.

52 Id. at 2642-43; see also id. at 2649 (reasoning that the minimum coverage provision
"rests upon a theory that everything is within federal control simply because it exists").

56

Id. at 2648.
Id.
See, e.g., id. at 2647.
Id. at 2646.

57

Id.

53
54
55
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merce that is regulated, and not merely the failure to engage in
commerce."5 8
II. PosT-NFIB MANDATE

ANALYSIS

A majority of Justices in NFIB found that the individual mandate
fell beyond the federal commerce power. But what are the contours
of the principle that drove the decision? One might conclude that no
commerce power principle of any kind can be derived from the
Court's ruling because no group of five Justices signed onto a single
opinion. 59 Few lower courts, however, are likely to take such a dismissive view of a landmark decision, especially when existing law instructs them to distill controlling principles from Supreme Court
rulings even when those rulings do not produce a unified majority. 60
From another perspective, NFIB says nothing special about mandates at all. On this view, the Court's key move involved its invigoration of the word "proper" as used in the Necessary and Proper
Clause. 61 It follows, so the argument goes, that NFIB exposes all laws,
not only mandates, to invalidation if they offend the "spirit of the constitution." 62 But this observation, even if true, misses a key point: Five
Justices found that the individual mandate crossed the proper/improper dividing line precisely because it embodied a mandate-a
point made clear by the use of the word "mandate" and its cognate
forms more than 100 times in the opinions of the Chief Justice and the
Id. at 2649.
See, e.g., United States v. Kiste, No. 3:12-CR-113 JD, 2013 WL 587556, at *4 (N.D. Ind.
Feb. 13, 2013) (noting courts' debate on whether the Chief Justice's Commerce Clause holding is
dicta or binding precedent); Gregory P. Magarian, Chief Justice Roberts's Individual Mandate:
The Lawless Medicine of NFIB v. Sebelius, 108 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 15, 19 (2013), available at http://www.law.northwestern.edullawreview/colloquy/2013/4/LRColl2013n4Magarian.pdf
("Why did the four joint dissenters, who echo the Chief Justice's restrictive federal power analysis, decline even to concur in his judgment? Presumably because this part of the Chief Justice's
opinion announces no judgment in which to concur."); Balkin, supra note 12 (explaining that
"'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds,"' but that in NFIB the Justices who agreed
with the Chief Justice in "limiting the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause
do not concur in the judgment; they dissent" (quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193
(1977))).
60 See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (noting that the narrowest concurring view constitutes the holding in a split decision); see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, The AntiLeveraging Principleand the Spending Clause After NFIB, 101 GEo. L.J. 861, 868 & n.24 (2013)
(reasoning that, "as a practical matter, lower courts can be expected to seek to identify and apply
those propositions that would command the assent of five Justices to avoid reversal").
61 See Somin, supra note 15, at 146.
62 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
58
59
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joint opinion writers.63 In other words, whatever one might conclude
about other types of laws, the fact that the "individual mandate" was a
mandate gave rise to a distinct constitutional problem for a majority
of the Court. And so the Court's ruling reflected a new and specialized anti-mandate principle of some sort.
The boundaries of this principle are far from clear,64 and I argue
in the final part of this paper that courts should apply it with caution.
Some courts, however, may reject this narrow-interpretation approach. Other courts, while adopting narrow-interpretation rhetoric,
might nonetheless read NFIB to expose many laws to invalidation. 65
Even courts that take a decidedly narrow view of the anti-mandate
principle will inevitably have to face tough questions about what laws
fall within its domain. 66
These realities indicate the need to develop an overarching methodology for evaluating challenges to federal laws based on the Court's
new anti-mandate principle. In the pages that follow, I suggest what
the basic structure of that methodology should look like. This methodology requires courts to ask two questions. The first focuses on
63

See generally NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).

See Kiste, 2013 WL 587556, at *5 ("NFIB provides little guidance as to how lower courts
should distinguish between activity or inactivity or between regulating activity and compelling
it."); Jack M. Balkin, The Court Affirms the Social Contract, in THE HEALTH CARE CASE, Supra
note 10, at 11, 15 (asserting that the future impact of NFIB "will depend on who wins the next
several presidential elections" and that "[i]f the Republicans dominate American politics in the
decades to come, Roberts's opinion will seem much more conservative than it does now");
Graetz & Mashaw, supra note 12, at 300, 310; Neil S. Siegel, More Law Than Politics: The Chief
the "Mandate," Legality, and Statesmanship, in THE HEALTH CARE CASE, supra note 10, at 192,
204 (noting that "Roberts's language is vague and difficult to apply" and wondering how "Congress and the courts [will] distinguish between a 'great substantive and independent power' beyond those enumerated in the Constitution, and a power merely 'derivative of, and in service to,
a granted power"' (quoting NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2591-93)); Somin, supra note 15, at 159 ("The
future effects of NFIB's Necessary and Proper holding are difficult to predict. It is possible that
it will have a significant impact, but also possible that its effects will be extremely limited.");
Weiner, supra note 10, at 77-78 (describing the Chief Justice's reasoning as based on a lack of
comfort with the individual mandate, providing an unworkable standard, and leaving courts with
a "blank slate" to work with as they choose); Lawrence B. Solum, How NFIB v. Sebelius Affects
the ConstitutionalGestalt 1-2 (Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research
Paper Grp., Paper No. 12-152, 2013) ("[T]he direct legal effects [of NFIB's Commerce Clause
and Necessary and Proper Clause holdings] are complex and likely to be disputed.").
65 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Political Ideology and Constitutional Decisionmaking:
The Coming Example of the Affordable Care Act, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 13-14 (2012)
(arguing that an activity-versus-inactivity distinction could lead to the invalidation of pollution
regulations); see also infra notes 72-74 and accompanying text (discussing antidiscrimination
laws).
66 See Driesen, supra note 17 (positing that NFIB will "spur more litigation than direct
results" and "enrich a lot of lawyers").
64
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whether the challenged law imposes a mandate. The second asks
whether, if a law does impose a mandate, it falls inside or outside
NFIB's condemnatory reach. 67
A.

Is It a Mandate?

A majority of the Court condemned the so-called "minimum coverage provision" because it embodied a "mandate," as opposed to another form of government intervention. The propriety of this
characterization was not self-evident. Justice Ginsburg, for example,
suggested that the law could be viewed as a prohibition on self-insuring. 68 This depiction highlights a broader problem-namely, that
murkiness has always shrouded the dividing line between mandates
and prohibitions because it is almost always possible to characterize
putative inactivity as some form of activity. 69 To take a simple example, does a rule that requires the use of safety helmets in mines impose
a mandate to wear helmets or a prohibition on working in mines without them? 70 The difficulty posed by such questions has led some
scholars to dismiss them as involving nothing more than "semantics." 7 '

67 I note here that some courts may seek to collapse these two questions into one-perhaps, for example, by deeming all mandates outside the commerce power and applying the fourfactor analysis in deciding whether to apply the mandate characterization. In my view, the
Court's opinions (including the Chief Justice's implication that some mandates might qualify as
"proper," see NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2592-93 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.)) signal a gravitation toward
the sort of two-step methodology I propose here. But even if I am wrong, the ideas developed in
this Article are of critical importance. This is the case because the focus here is on the four key
forces that may well guide the operation of the anti-mandate principle, and those forces are
likely to influence whether courts called on to apply that principle engage in a one-step or a twostep dance.
68 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2622 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
69 See, e.g., Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1213 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting that the
difference between a positive right to have the government do something and a negative right to
be left alone by the government is often a matter of perspective); United States v. Lott, 912 F.
Supp. 2d 146, 154 (D. Vt. 2012) (highlighting the murkiness underlying the activity/inactivity and
regulating/compelling distinctions); Strauss, supra note 16, at 19-23 (discussing "the arbitrary
distinction between action and inaction" that was "the key to [the Court's] limiting principle" in
NFIB; reasoning that "[e]ven 'inaction' involves a choice and, in that sense, is an action"). See
generally J.M. Balkin, The Rhetoric of Responsibility, 76 VA. L. REV. 197, 228-30 (1990) (explaining how the omission/commission distinction can be manipulated); Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REV. 591, 637-39 (1981)
(describing the "blurry" line between commission and omission).
70 See 30 C.F.R. § 77.1710 (2013) (setting forth mining helmet requirement).
71

See Jamal Greene, The Missing Due Process Argument, in

supra note 10, at 91, 94.
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Consider also the Court's landmark decision in Katzenbach v.
McClung.72 After NFIB, would the Court say that application of the
Civil Rights Act of 196473 to Ollie's Barbecue involved a mandate to
seat black customers, as opposed to a prohibition on excluding them
from the restaurant? 74 Other problems of characterization recur in
applying the mandate/non-mandate distinction, and I touch on several
of them in the pages that follow. For now, it suffices to recognize
three key points about this initial inquiry. First, as we have seen, the
characterization of particular rules as mandates or as non-mandates
often will present analytical challenges. Second, the health care decision offers limited guidance for dealing with those challenges, apart
from establishing that the ACA's minimum coverage provision itself
qualifies as a mandate. Third, the practical impact of the Court's new
anti-mandate principle will hinge in no small measure on how far the
mandate label reaches. Put simply, the larger the number of laws that
qualify as mandates, the larger will be the number of laws that might
run afoul of the Court's new anti-mandate principle.
B.

The Four-FactorInquiry

Once a court decides that a law imposes a mandate, it must next
ask whether that mandate contravenes the teaching of NFIB. Consider two laws: (1) the now-familiar regulation that requires persons
who work in mines to wear safety equipment;75 and (2) the statute at
issue in NFIB itself, which (for purposes of the commerce power, as
opposed to the taxing power) requires persons who make more than a
72 Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 296-97, 304-05 (1964) (upholding the public accommodations provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 under the commerce power).

Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241.
74 See Chemerinsky, supra note 65, at 13 ("Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act regulates
inactivity, requiring that hotels and restaurants serve African-American customers even if they
do not want to do so."); Strauss, supra note 16, at 14-15 ("Title II [of the Civil Rights Act of
1964] was a mandate .... The owner of a restaurant had to serve racial minorities, whether he
wanted to or not. Many antidiscrimination laws share this feature."); Weiner, supra note 10, at
75 (asserting that "[a] prohibition on discriminating in providing accommodations is a mandate
to treat people equally, and in particular, to engage in commerce with them"; adding that "[t]o
argue that a motel owner can avoid the mandate by not operating a motel-in other words, by
giving up his livelihood-hardly frames a realistic choice"); see also Richard A. Posner, Supreme
Court Year in Review: The Commerce Clause Was Clearly Enough to Uphold the Affordable
Care Act, SLATE (June 28, 2012, 5:38 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and-politics/the
breakfasttable/features/2012/ supreme.court-year inreview/affordablecare.act-upheld
why.the.commerce clause.should.have.beenenough_.html (indicating the same view of Title
II).
73

75

See supra note 70.
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specified amount of money to acquire health insurance. 7 6 We know
that the Court in NFIB held that the latter mandate is not a permissible exercise of the commerce power. But what about the former? In
other words, assuming our miner-helmet law is viewed as imposing a
mandate on individual miners, does the law nonetheless fall outside of
the anti-mandate principle of NFIB?
Most of us will sense-indeed, assume-that the answer is yes.
But it is not apparent how courts will find their way to this result.
One possibility is that they will affix to the anti-mandate principle a
bright-line limit that fences out from its operation many federal statutes and regulations, including our miner-helmet law. At least three
such limits seem possible, but each stands open to serious criticism.
First, a court might say that NFIB outlaws only the use of mandates put in place as necessary prerequisites to the installation of companion regulatory controls (in NFIB, the ACA's antidiscrimination
provisions). On this view, mandates are unconstitutional only when
they have a double-whammy effect, in the sense that they produce
federal intervention by way of both the mandate itself and the broader
set of non-mandate laws that the mandate is needed to prop up.77 This
interpretation builds on the Chief Justice's assertion that governing
law precludes Congress from "creat[ing] the necessary predicate to ...
exercise" the commerce power.78 But it is far from clear that the
Chief Justice meant to use this terse phrase to operate in this farreaching way. Moreover, adopting this double-whammy limitation
would clash with other parts of the Court's rationale, including by
leaving unscathed the hypothetical freestanding congressional command to buy vegetables, which five Justices unabashedly

condemned. 79
Second, a court might conclude that NFIB outlaws requirements
to buy or sell goods or services-but not mandates of any other kind.80
This view draws support from passages in the opinions that condemn
76

26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2012).

See Andrew Koppelman, "Necessary," "Proper," and Health Care Reform, in THE
supra note 10, at 105, 114 (asserting that Chief Justice Roberts's "claim ...
is that Congress cannot arrogate to itself the power to solve problems that are of its own
making").
78 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2592 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
79 See supra notes 38, 54 and accompanying text.
80 Siegel, supra note 64, at 205 (reading the Roberts opinion "as prohibiting Congress
from imposing purchase mandates, not as prohibiting Congress from ever regulating 'inactiv77
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ity'"; adding, for example, that "[flederal power to quarantine or mandate vaccination might be
critical in a public health emergency, such as a flu pandemic that disrespects state borders").
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"compel[ling] individuals to become active in commerce," 1 to buy an
"unwanted product," 82 or to purchase an "unwanted suite of products." 83 Thus, the argument continues, though there are limits on congressional authority to compel the making of a purchase or a sale,
nothing stands in the way of a mandate to wear safety equipment,
because simply wearing equipment does not involve a commercial
transaction at all. 84 There is, however, a significant difficulty with this
effort to limit the scope of the anti-mandate principle. To be sure, the
Court in NFIB focused on the idea that the power to regulate commerce does not include the power to create commerce. But the creation of commerce at least has something to do with commerce, and
thus with the subject of the Commerce Clause. It would seem to follow from this idea that mandates that compel activities that are not
commercial at all generate problems under the Commerce Clause that
are at least as great as (if not greater than) the problems generated by
mandates that create commerce itself.85 And under this logic, all mandates-whether to engage in commerce or to do something elseshould fall within the ambit of NFIB's anti-mandate principle.
Finally, a court might conclude that only totally unconditional
mandates are susceptible to invalidation under the principle of NFIB.
In other words, so long as the mandate is attached to a person's commercial activity (such as taking employment with a mining company),
the mandate itself is ipso facto a permissible exercise of the commerce
power. As it turns out, however, there are two problems with this
reading of NFIB. First, as a real-world matter, the individual mandate
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2587 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (emphasis omitted).
See id. at 2586 & n.3.
83 See id. at 2648 n.2 (joint dissent).
84 See Koppelman, supra note 77, at 105 (noting that parts of the Chief Justice's arguments
represented a "raw intuition that being required to enter into a contract is an extraordinary
burden"); see also United States v. Sterling Centrecorp Inc., 960 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1053 (E.D.
Cal. 2013) (seeming to conclude that no anti-mandate problem arose where penalties were triggered by a decision to "ignore the continuous discharges of contaminated water into the environment, or to allow the timber dam to deteriorate to the point of failure" because a government
rule with respect to these choices did not involve compelling someone "to purchase an unwanted
product" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
85 See United States v. Lott, 912 F. Supp. 2d 146, 155 (D. Vt. 2012) (noting the oddity of
any distinction that would permit Congress to compel noneconomic activity but not economic
81

82

activity); Corey Rayburn Yung, The Incredible Ordinarinessof Federal Penaltiesfor Inactivity,

2012 Wis. L. REV. 841, 868 (arguing that if noncommercial mandates are proper, then the ACA's
commercial mandate is proper because, as a commercial mandate, it has a "tighter nexus" to
interstate commerce); see also Theodore W. Ruger, Health Policy Devolution and the InstitutionalHydraulics of the Affordable Care Act, in THE HEALTH

CARE CASE,

supra note 10, at 359,

359 (highlighting that the Chief Justice's controlling opinion focused on "the kinetic requirement
of physical activity as opposed to inactivity").
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itself was not unconditional. Rather, persons were subject to a penalty for violating it only if they engaged in enough commercial activity
to generate personal income in excess of a threshold amount. 86 Second, the four joint opinion writers appeared to reject the unconditional-mandate limit when they wrote, "the mere fact that we all
consume food and are thus, sooner or later, participants in the 'market' for food, does not empower the Government to say when and
what we will buy."87 This language suggests that Congress cannot impose mandates as to "what we will buy" even if those mandates are
conditioned on the commercial act of buying food.88
Confronted with the challenges of validating the miner-helmet
law under a ready-made, bright-line test, courts would have to find
another way to sustain it. Picking up on the rationale of NFIB itself,
they could say that the miner-helmet law is distinguishable from the
individual mandate because it does not involve the exercise of a "great
substantive" power. 89 But any analysis at this level of generality simply begs the question. A sound treatment would have to go further in
identifying functional differences between the cases. And as it turns
out, functional differences do exist.
The first concerns what I call "escapability." This consideration-which directs attention to whether the target of a mandate can
readily elude it-distinguishes our two cases in a powerful way. People, after all, do not have to work in mines. Even if they take employ86 See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(e)(2) (2012); see also NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2580 (noting the inapplicability of the ACA penalty provision to individuals "with income below a certain threshold").
See generally infra note 90 and accompanying text (elaborating on this point).
87 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2648 (joint dissent).
88 See also Yung, supra note 85, at 868 (arguing that attaching an otherwise impermissible
mandate to any "innocuous activity" would render NFIB a "matter of hyper-formalism"). There
is another possible categorical limit on the anti-mandate principle, though not one that would
remove it from our miner-helmet law. A court might conclude that the principle attaches only to
compelled interactions with private parties, and not to compelled interactions with the government. Some support for this notion might be drawn from footnote five of Chief Justice Roberts's
opinion. There, he distinguished the individual mandate from supposedly analogous mandates,
in the form of condemnations of private property, by reasoning that condemnations do not involve a "commercial transaction between the landowner and the Government, let alone a government-compelled transaction between the landowner and a third party." NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at
2587 n.5 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.). This language might be read to suggest that federal mandates do not fall within the anti-mandate principle unless they involve a compelled transaction
with "a third party." See Fried, supra note 12, at 57 (suggesting that the offense to individual
liberty posed by the individual mandate was the requirement to buy something from a "nongovernmental purveyor"). To extract such an idea from a brief passage in one footnote signed onto
by only one Justice, however, involves a long analytical leap.
89 See supra note 44 and accompanying text (noting the Chief Justice's reliance on this
concept).
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ment with mining companies, they can do so in ways that do not
involve mining itself. They also can pursue entirely different lines of
work, including by moving to geographical areas where mining does
not dominate the local economy. As it turns out, many people born
into mining communities do just that, especially under modern conditions that permit easy relocation, job retraining, and the like. On the
other hand, very few citizens have a similar opportunity to sidestep
the ACA's individual mandate. To be sure, that mandate is not entirely inescapable because people can dodge it by reducing their annual income to around a bottom-13% level. 90 But it is not plausible to
expect people to do so because of the real-world burden that making
such a move would impose. The health care mandate thus raises much
more pressing concerns about escapability than does the miner-helmet
law.
A second factor focuses attention on "relatedness." Assume, for
example, that Congress passed a law that required persons who work
in mines to buy broccoli once a week. This law would be no less escapable than the miner-helmet law because miners in both cases could
avoid the mandate by changing their line of work. Most of us will
sense, however, that the conditional miners-must-buy-broccoli mandate is more problematic than the mandate of in-mine helmet use.
The reason is that the use of helmets bears a sensible relationship to
working in mines, whereas the buying of broccoli does not. Indeed,
judicial attentiveness to relatedness runs throughout our constitutional doctrines-making appearances in such diverse areas as the law
90 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2599 (majority opinion) (noting that the mandate's penaltyimposing operation was "triggered by specific circumstances-earning a certain amount of income but not obtaining health insurance"); see also How Much Is the Obamacare "Tax"?,
FACTCHECK.ORG, http://www.factcheck.org/2012/06/how-much-is-the-obamacare-tax/
(last updated Dec. 20, 2013) (noting that the individual mandate only applies to those with "household
income[s] that exceed[ I the income threshold for filing a tax return," which was "$9,500 for a
single person under age 65, and $19,000 for a married person filing jointly with a spouse" in
2011); Income Breaks, 2011, TAx POLICY CTR. (May 12, 2011), http://taxpolicycenter.org/numbers/displayatab.cfm?Docid=2970 (indicating that, in 2011, a $9,500 income represents the bottom 25% (20.65 million) of the 82.6 million single earners and a $19,000 income represents the
bottom 7-8% (11.67-13.34 million) of the 166.7 million married persons filing jointly, corresponding to roughly 12.97-13.63% of these 249.3 million earners). Relevant statutory language
appears at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(e)(1)-(2). See generally Weiner, supra note 10, at 86 n.64 (noting
that "one could argue that individuals could avoid the mandate by choosing not to earn income,
because those who make too little to file a tax return are exempt from the penalty [because] the
penalty is the only legal consequence of not purchasing insurance"); Dan T. Coenen, The
OriginalistCase for the "IndividualMandate": Rounding out the Government's Argument in the
Health Care Case 5 n.10 (Univ. of Ga. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper
No. 12-05, 2012) [hereinafter Coenen, Originalist Case], available at http://ssrn.comlabstract=2053795 (outlining income-based exemptions from the penalty).
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of conditional spending,9' the market participant exception to the dormant Commerce Clause, 92 and the field of unconstitutional conditions. 93 No less important, both the Chief Justice and his four
commerce power compatriots in NFIB indicated that relatedness had
some role to play in mandate cases. 94 And once one accepts the relevance of relatedness in assessing federal mandates under the commerce power, distinguishing our two cases on this ground presents
little difficulty. No one needs an advanced degree, after all, to see
that wearing a mining helmet bears a closer relation to working in a
mine than buying health insurance (as opposed to buying anything
else) bears to simply earning a base-level amount of money.
A third factor centers on "invasiveness "-that is, the degree to
which a challenged mandate trenches on individual liberty. Notably,
both the Chief Justice and the joint opinion writers recoiled at the
intensity of the invasion worked on individuals by the ACA's individual mandate. In effect, they asserted that it was a severe intrusion for
the government to compel citizens to spend large sums of their money
on products they did not want to buy at all. Indeed, summoning up
images of the most oppressive communist dictatorships, the four joint
opinion writers assailed the individual mandate as defensible only if
one were ready to vest in Congress a "general authority to direct the
economy." 95 Whatever one thinks about this depiction, it casts no
shadow over the miner-helmet mandate. That law, after all, imposes
no meaningful cost on mine workers at all. Instead, it imposes a low91 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987).
92 See S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 93-99 (1984) (imposing samemarket test in applying the market participant rule).
93 See, e.g., Agency for Int'l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc'y Int'l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321,
2332 (2013) (finding the conditional speech requirement so loosely related to the purpose of the
federal funding program that it abridged First Amendment rights); United States v. Am. Library
Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 217-28 (2003) (Breyer, J., concurring) (declaring that the Court considers
"whether the statute works speech-related harm that, in relation to [the statute's] objective, is
out of proportion"); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 386 (1994) (requiring an "essential
nexus" between a state interest said to impede the granting of a land-use permit and any condition imposed on that permit's issuance).
94 See infra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
95 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2646 (joint dissent); see id. ("If Congress can reach out and command even those furthest removed from an interstate market to participate in the market, then
the Commerce Clause becomes a font of unlimited power . . . ."); see also Michael C. Dorf,
Commerce, Death Panels, and Broccoli: Or Why the Activity/Inactivity Distinction in the Health
Care Case Was Really About the Right to Bodily Integrity, 29 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 897, 897 (2013)

(suggesting that the case against the individual mandate gained traction because of fears "that
upholding the law's so-called individual mandate would permit the government to require people to eat broccoli").

2014] THE COMMERCE POWER AND CONGRESSIONAL

MANDATES 1071

impact, use-related rule that operates only for the time the miner is on
the job and already under work-related supervision.
A final factor directs attention to what we might call "policy sensitivity." Because this factor has a nebulous quality, courts may (and
probably should) hesitate to give it a preponderating influence. But
its practical effect cannot be ignored, and therefore it merits inclusion
on our list. Some analysts might conclude, for example, that the conditional nature of the health care mandate, if upheld, would encourage some citizens to escape it by striving to earn less money, thus
reducing national productivity and a salutary commitment to the individual work ethic. In addition, they might say that considerations of
fairness cut for-not against-the miner-helmet mandate, in part because everyone recognizes that the mining industry is one in which
government controls are understandably expected and therefore fairly
imposed. 96 In contrast, a majority of Justices in the health care case
looked askance at the minimum coverage provision in large measure
because they saw it as a "novelty"97 and "unprecedented." 9 8
The foregoing analysis suggests why courts are likely to pay heed
to escapability, relatedness, invasiveness, and policy sensitivity in commerce power mandate cases. No less important, it indicates why Supreme Court precedents, especially NFIB itself, support this
approach. How these four factors will interact in future cases is not
easy to predict. There is reason to believe, however, that courts will
focus at the outset on escapability, in part because it is intrinsically
tied to whether a law imposes a mandate at all. Picking up on this
idea, I turn first to federal laws that establish the purest form of mandate because they are entirely inescapable.
III.

PROBLEMS OF PURE INESCAPABILITY

As we have seen, the individual mandate was conditional in nature. 99 Even so, it had such a low level of escapability that it raised
insuperable problems under the anti-mandate principle. Some mandates, however, rank even lower on the escapability index. This is the
case because they are entirely unconditional and thus not escapable at
all. Consider, for example, proposals for the establishment of a na96 For an illustration of this style of analysis in the Contracts Clause context, see Energy
Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 409-19 (1983) (focusing on extensive past regulation of the industry in finding that no "substantial impairment" of contractual
rights had occurred).
97 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2586 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
98 See id. at 2648 (joint dissent).
99 See supra notes 86, 90 and accompanying text.
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tional service program, under which all young Americans would have
to engage in a year or two of public service work once they reach the
age of eighteen.100 After NFIB, any such program would present a
profound constitutional problem. The difficulty is that aging is an inevitable part of living, so that such a law would involve pure inescapability. In this Part, I examine three other forms of government
control that impose mandates marked by this analytically important
trait-namely, mandates associated with (1) programs that compel the
taking of actions related to public health, (2) certain applications of
possessory-crime statutes, and (3) government takings of property for
transfer to private developers. In each of these areas, the Court's
path-breaking decision in NFIB gives rise to previously unrecognized
constitutional problems.
A.

Public Health Programs

Six years ago, in a highly publicized action, the national Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention ("CDC") issued a compulsory isolation order to an Atlanta attorney named Andrew Speaker.101
Speaker had been diagnosed (incorrectly, it turned out) with a rare
form of drug-resistant tuberculosis.102 Fearful that this disease might
spread, the CDC subjected Speaker to isolation under 42 U.S.C.
§ 264, a federal statute adopted pursuant to the Commerce Clause.103
In effect, the statute authorizes the agency to mandate, at a minimum,
the sequestration and examination of patients who threaten to spread
diseases across state or national borders. 04
NFIB raises new questions about the constitutionality of § 264
and similar laws. Is an isolation order properly characterized as a prohibition or a mandate? Assuming it is otherwise a prohibition, does it
become a mandate if accompanied by a requirement that the patient
report to a particular location, submit to a physical examination, receive medical treatment, or wear a respiratory mask? Is the exertion
of federal control over someone like Speaker subject to challenge be100 See, e.g., Thomas E. Ricks, Op-Ed., Let's Draft Our Kids, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2012, at
A21 (proposing that every eighteen-year-old work on behalf of the nation for eighteen months).
101 See, e.g., Vikki Valentine, A Timeline of Andrew Speaker's Infection, NPR (June 6,
2007), http://www.npr.org/news/specials/tb/.
102 See id.

See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Legal Authorities for Isolation and Quarantine (June 28, 2013), http://www.cdc.gov/quarantine/aboutlawsregulationsquarantineisolation.
html (explaining constitutional authority for the law).
104 See Public Health Service Act § 361(d), 42 U.S.C. § 264(d) (2012) (allowing the Surgeon
General to make regulations authorizing the "apprehension and examination" of individuals
with infectious diseases, who can be detained until no longer infectious).
103
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cause it regulates (to use the joint opinion writers' phrase) "mere
breathing in and out"?105 Should it matter that the subject of the order may soon cross, or has recently crossed, state or national
borders?106
A kindred line of questioning made an appearance during oral
argument in the health care case. Expressing concern about invalidating the minimum coverage provision, Justice Breyer asked counsel for
the law's challengers whether, "if it turned out there was some terrible
epidemic sweeping the United States,.. . you'd say the Federal Government doesn't have the power to get people inoculated."1o 7 Counsel
replied: "[No, they couldn't do it."1os This exchange highlights the
now-looming question whether Congress could invoke the commerce
power to require all citizens, or a portion of the general population, to
receive injections-r take other unwanted steps to stem the spread of a
devastating disease.
How would such a program fare under our four-factor analysis?
To begin with, it would present acute problems of inescapabilty because individuals would have to submit to it regardless of personal
choice. Meanwhile, the relatedness factor would not operate here (at
least in an ordinary sense) precisely because the mandate is inescapable. Put another way, what makes a mandate inescapable is that
it operates independently of any condition that is based on the voluntary conduct of the mandate's target. And what determines relatedness is the nexus between the legally imposed mandate and the
voluntary conduct that triggers its operation. Because in this case (as
in other cases of pure inescapability) there is no voluntary conduct in
the picture, the question of relatedness simply falls away.109
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2643 (2012) (joint dissent).
See COENEN, supra note 8, at 38-39, 64-70 (discussing potentially broad congressional
power to prevent interstate shipment of persons and goods).
107 Transcript of Oral Argument at 86-87, Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 132
S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398) [hereinafter Oral Argument], available at http://www.
supremecourt.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/i1-398-Tuesday.pdf.
108 Id. at 87. The reason, he explained, is that Congress cannot act under the commerce
power simply to generate "beneficial downstream effects" on commerce, as shown (so it was
said) by the Court's earlier decision invalidating a federal ban on gender-based violence. See id.
at 88 (referring to United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000), which rejected regulation
of "noneconomic ... conduct based solely on that conduct's aggregate effect on interstate commerce"). After all, counsel explained, the Court intervened in that case even though Congress
had addressed a subject that exerts a "very profound effect" on national health and commerce.
Id. at 88.
109 It bears emphasis that there are potentially complicating factors here. As to inescapability, one might note that some public health interventions will target only persons who
have already contracted diseases (as was the case with Mr. Speaker). See supra note 101 and
105

106
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As a result, application of the four-factor analysis in cases of this
kind will quickly move to consideration of invasiveness and policy sensitivity. The invasiveness factor offers room for argument on each
side when it comes to federal public health programs, particularly the
sort of inoculation measures described by Justice Breyer." 0 Some
analysts will deem these programs highly invasive because they involve an unconsented-to affront to a person's body,", in contravention of generally governing norms of tort and constitutional law.112
Others, however, will say that even mandated inoculations involve
only a momentary and limited intrusion-especially if the safety of the
treatment has already been established and its side effects are demonstrably minor. In the end, as Justice Breyer's question suggests, many
judges are likely to accord controlling effect to policy sensitivity in this
context. Along the way, they might well emphasize that protections of
bodily integrity often give way to countervailing public needs.' 1 3 And
here, a program of compulsory inoculation might safeguard the health
of the entire American workforce, or even stave off economic
collapse.
accompanying text. Moreover, some such persons may have engaged in risky behavior that resulted in the infection, thus raising questions about whether the condition that triggered the
mandate should be characterized as inescapable, even if it was not a desired object of a personal
choice. As to relatedness, some mandates will be conditioned on facts that bear no relationship
to voluntary choices-including when a duty to receive treatment is conditioned on having a
disease, or unluckily happening to be located in a small geographic area. Courts applying the
anti-mandate principle may well take account of the degree of relatedness between these sorts of
conditions and the federal mandate. (For example, it would make little sense for the federal
government to extend a curative mandate properly directed at already-ill persons to large numbers of others who are not ill at all.) Our hypothesized case involving wide-scale prophylactic
inoculations, however, does not involve this type of relatedness question.
110 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
111 See Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1558 (2013) (noting that drawing blood to test
for alcohol implicates concerns of bodily integrity).
112 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 724 (1997) (describing the relationship
between informed consent and the common law tort of battery); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of
Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269-70, 282-86 (1990) (recognizing traditional requirement of consent for
medical treatment); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 174 (1952) (ruling that the taking of
capsules from stomach of arrestee violated Fourteenth Amendment); see also Greene, supra
note 71, at 97 ("[F]orced vaccination implicates bodily integrity and so is arguably more intrusive
than a forced insurance purchase . . . ."). In addition, at least if it required targeted populations
to contribute to the cost of treatment, such a program would operate to "compel individuals ...
to purchase an unwanted product." NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2586 (2012) (opinion of Roberts,

C.J.).
113 See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-72 (1966) (upholding a blood test to
check defendant's blood alcohol concentration where the officer might have reasonably perceived an emergency and the test was performed in a reasonable manner; reasoning that "the
Constitution does not forbid the States minor intrusions into an individual's body under stringently limited conditions").
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As we have seen, however, many courts may care little about policy arguments of this kind, opting instead for a more formal inquiry
into whether compulsory inoculation involves the use of a "great substantive" or only an "incidental" power.114 And there is language in
the health care decision that will offer aid to challengers of even the
most critical public health measure. As the Chief Justice observed:
"The peculiar circumstances of the moment may render a measure
more or less wise, but cannot render it more or less constitutional." 5
The current Court, or some future Court, could draw upon this rhetoric in rejecting appeals on behalf of an inoculation program designed
to stem even a looming catastrophe.
Under modern conditions of urban living, the globalization of
markets, and routine international travel, the dangers posed by transmittable maladies such as "bird flu" or SARS are increasingly
grave. 11 6 Moreover, our history shows that courts-notwithstanding
the rhetoric of the Chief Justice in NFIB-often moderate the operation of constitutional constraints in the face of pressing public
needs." 7 It thus may be that future rulings on public health programs
will hinge on contextual considerations, including the level of threat to
the national economy.118 In all cases, however, NFIB will present new
obstacles to crafting federal responses to contagious diseases.
B.

Problems with Possession Bans
In United States v. Lopez,119 the Court struck down a federal ban

on the possession of guns in or near a school.120 The law, the Court
reasoned, exceeded the commerce power because it targeted
114 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2592-93 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 411, 418 (1819)).
115 Id. at 2579 (quoting John Marshall, A Friend of the Constitution No. V, ALEXANDRIA
GAZETTE, July 5, 1819, reprintedin JOHIN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF McCulloch v. Maryland 184,
190-91 (Gerald Gunther ed., 1969)).
116 See, e.g., David Quammen, Op-Ed., The Next Pandemic: Not If but When, N.Y. TIMES,
May 10, 2013, at A29 (highlighting the ease with which illnesses may spread in light of
globalization).
117 See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219-20 (1944) (upholding conviction
of a Japanese-American for violating a wartime relocation order, notwithstanding application of

"strict scrutiny" to an ethnicity-based program that impinged on fundamental rights).
118 See Mark A. Hall, ConstitutionalMortality: PrecedentialEffects of Striking the Individual Mandate, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 107 (2012) (describing as "chilling" the potential
loss of life if the federal government cannot impose public health mandates); Weiner, supra note
10, at 76 (arguing that courts are not likely to impede the federal government's handling of
crises, such as a pandemic).
119 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
120 See id. at 567-68.
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noneconomic activity. 1 21 In Gonzales v. Raich,122 however, the Court
limited the holding of Lopez when it sustained a federal prohibition
on possessing marijuana.12 3 The Court reasoned that the marijuana
law was distinguishable from the gun law because it helped to effectuate companion restrictions on drug selling and buying as part of a
"comprehensive regulatory regime." 124 Raich opened the door for the
enactment of federal possession bans of many sorts. On one reading
of the decision, Congress can evade the trap laid down in Lopez so
long as it couples any ban on possessing any good with restrictions on

its sale and purchase.12 5
The Court's ruling in NFIB, however, may create an exception to
the exception set forth in Raich. Indeed, it may create two such exceptions-one involving the phase-in of new possession bans and the
other involving the regulation of possession that follows innocent acquisition of a controlled item.
1. Possession Ban Phase-Ins
Assume that tomorrow Congress passes a law that prohibits, for
the first time, the possession-as well as the purchase and sale-of a
recently engineered recreational drug named "chemo-pot." Assume
also that, on the day the law takes effect, John Q. Schmoeky (like
many others) is in possession of this intoxicant. In light of Raich, we
can declare with confidence that the new law is constitutional as applied to persons who knowingly take possession of the banned substance after the law's effective date. But what about Schmoeky?
Must he get rid of the chemo-pot he already possessed when the law
took hold? After NFIB, the answer is not clear. If Schmoeky is prosecuted for continued possession, he will argue that the law is unconstitutional as applied to him because it subjects him to an individual
mandate-that is, a mandate to take affirmative steps to rid himself of
the now-banned substance. Put another way, he will argue that the
121 See id. at 567 (emphasizing that "possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense
an economic activity").
122 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
123 See id. at 23-25.
124 See id. at 27.
125 See, e.g., United States v. Rose, 714 F.3d 362, 371 (6th Cir. 2013) (describing in broad
terms the operation of Raich to authorize possession bans-here, of child pornography); United
States v. Henry, 688 F.3d 637, 641 (9th Cir. 2012) (indicating that the principle of Raich extends
to guns with a unique design, thus covering more than fungible items); United States v. Rene E.,
583 F.3d 8, 18 (1st Cir. 2009) (relying on Raich to declare that bans on gun possession "suppress[] demand and therefore [are] an essential part of regulating the national market in
firearms").
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new law runs afoul of the commerce power because it punishes mere
"inactivity" in the form of failing to dispose of chemo-pot after the
new law comes into effect. 1 26
Schmoeky's argument might go up in smoke. Some judges, for
example, will say that the chemo-pot statute does not subject
Schmoeky to a mandate at all because on its face it imposes a criminal
prohibition-indeed, the very common form of criminal prohibition
that bars the possession of a particular intoxicant. They might add
that the prohibition label fits comfortably because Schmoeky's posteffective-date possession constitutes an action-indeed, the actus reus
of the crime.127 At the least, the chemo-pot statute is distinguishable
from the previously considered federal inoculation and national service programs because every application of those programs involves
the imposition of an individual mandate in a direct and uncomplicated
form. The Schmoeky case, in contrast, involves an effort to argue that
a generally valid prohibitory statute operates in practical effect to impose a mandate only as applied to the limited number of cases that
involve pre-enactment chemo-pot acquisition.
But so what? The Court often has recognized that particular applications of statutes may be unconstitutional even if the statute can
stand as a general matter. 128 The Court also has declared that judicial
inquiries should focus not on the form of a statute but on its "practical
operation."129 Based on these principles, Schmoeky will argue that
the new law, as applied to him, is unconstitutional because, as a functional matter, it mandates that he get rid of his chemo-pot.
Assume that a court concludes that the new chemo-pot statute
does impose a mandate on persons such as Schmoeky. How would
the challenge to his prosecution hold up under the four-factor analysis
126 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2590 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.); United States v. Alexander, 516 F. App'x 368, 369 (5th Cir. 2013) (noting claim by defendant, though not properly
raised below, that after NFIB, "possession, to be considered ongoing commerce, must be
tethered to some requirement that the firearm has been purchased, sold, or transported within a
specified time period"); see also Yung, supra note 85, at 850-51 (arguing more generally that
"possession crimes do not actually punish any affirmative conduct").
127 See United States v. Roszkowski, 700 F.3d 50, 58 (1st Cir. 2012) ("In stark contrast to
the individual mandate in Sebelius, [possession] statutes do not 'compel[ ] individuals to become
active in commerce'; rather, they prohibit affirmative conduct that has an undeniable connection
to interstate commerce.") (second alteration in original).
128 See, e.g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 495-99, 504-06 (1977) (holding
unconstitutional the application of a generally valid city housing ordinance because it prevented
a cousin from living with his extended family).
129 Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359, 363 (1941). Indeed, both of these principles figured prominently in NFIB itself. See, e.g., NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2595, 2597-98.
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put forward here? As to escapability, an uncareful analyst might assert that the chemo-pot ban is readily escapable because Schmoeky
can simply throw his drugs in a waste basket. But that analysis reflects
confusion. Put simply, if the chemo-pot possession statute imposes a
mandate on Schmoeky, the only way to "escape" it is to comply with it
by disposing of the drugs. Such a mandate-that is, one whose sting
can be avoided only by compliance-is in its nature marked by pure
inescapability.
This is not to say, however, that ease of compliance with a mandate counts for nothing in cases of this kind. In fact, it does count
because it bears on the question of invasiveness. If the law imposes a
mandate, but that mandate is no big deal, then concerns about individual liberty become a matter of reduced importance. In the case of
Schmoeky, for example, it may well be that disposing of chemo-pot is
so costless-and therefore so lacking in invasiveness-that any mandate as applied to him is constitutional notwithstanding NFIB.
Considerations of policy sensitivity offer support for the same
conclusion. First, it may be fair to apply a disposal mandate to
Schmoeky on the theory that a later outlawing of the chemo-pot was
reasonably foreseeable on the date of acquisition precisely because of
its intoxicating qualities. 130 There is a second point, too. The ruling in
Raich found support in a practical concern about difficulties faced by
the government in regulating fungible contraband, and this same concern may complicate Schmoeky's effort to elude prosecution. 131 This
complication arises because if Schmoeky's mandate argument succeeds, the resulting judicial ruling will have spillover effects that protect defendants who never were subjected to a mandate at all. This is
the case because an embrace of Schmoeky's theory in effect will re130 Compare Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 182 (1990) ("Where a State can
easily foresee the invalidation of its tax statutes, its reliance interests may merit little concern . . . ."), with Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97,105-09 (1971) (refusing to retroactively
apply a state's statute of limitations where the "superseding legal doctrine ... unforeseeabl[y] ...
overruled a long line of decisions"). Notably, one might argue that the foreseeability of the
possession law renders the posited chemo-pot disposal mandate one that was escapable, or at
least outside the universe of mandates marked by pure inescapablility. In my view, courts are
not likely to go down this path. To do so, after all, they would have to conclude that a mandate
was somehow escapable before the mandate even came to exist.

131

See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005); cf Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 58 (1979)

(noting, in upholding a generalized ban on the sale of eagle feathers, that "feathers recently
taken can easily be passed off as having been obtained long ago"). Apart from questions under
the commerce power, application of possession bans to items acquired before a statute is enacted
may raise issues under the Takings Clause. See Andrus, 444 U.S. at 65 (noting, in this regard,
that regulations th'at banned the future sale of already acquired bird feathers did "not compel
the surrender of the artifacts").
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quire prosecutors to prove an element of the chemo-pot possession
crime that is not set forth in the statute itself-namely, an element
that concerns the date of acquisition. And prosecutors may often lack
an ability to rebut the claims of defendants that they secured the contraband before the ban on its possession took effect. In short, NFIB
could foreclose federal prosecutions for many properly prosecutable
possessory crimes because, while possession itself might be easy to
prove, the date of taking possession might not be.
As usual, there is a case to be made on the other side. As to
invasiveness, for example, it may be that disposing of chemo-pot is far
from costless, because acquiring even small amounts required substantial cash outlays or because a particular possessor acquired (at
whatever per-unit price) an unusually large supply prior to enactment
of the possession ban. Even absent these complications, some analysts will view application of the new statute to Schmoeky as deeply
unfair on the theory that it involves a form of retroactive lawmaking.132 At the least, they will say, Congress should have built into the
new prohibition a phase-in period, so as to allow most chemo-pot possessors (including Schmoeky) to use up the product they had legally
purchased before the ban kicked in. Here, as elsewhere, it is hard to
predict how courts will sort through this jumble of considerations.
The Schmoeky case, however, reveals one key point: Although individuals and groups often identified as "conservative" led the charge
against the so-called "Obamacare" program, the commerce-power
ruling they secured in NFIB now lies open for use by individuals and
groups often identified as "liberal," including defense lawyers bent on
reining in the nation's drug laws.
2.

Innocent Receipt of Contraband

It is not unusual for authorities to prosecute possessory crimes on
the theory that the defendant "was aware of his control [of the item]
for a sufficient period to have been able to terminate his possession."133 These cases may involve claims by defendants that they came
into possession of the banned substance in a nonculpable way. A corrupt law enforcement officer, for example, might sneak an illegal fire132 See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994) ("[T]he presumption against
retroactive legislation is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence."); cf Bradley Scott Shannon, The
Retroactive and Prospective Application of Judicial Decisions, 26 HARV. J.L. & Pus. POL'Y 811,
812-14 (2003) (recognizing an unfairness argument to "retroactive application of judicial decisions" based on a reliance interest in the "old" law).
133 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(4) (1962).
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arm into a passerby's coat pocket, or a passenger might throw a bag of
cocaine into the hands of the driver while suddenly exiting a car.
Under governing law, if the passerby or driver thereafter retains possession of the transferred item, each may be guilty of a federal offense. Federal law, after all, outlaws knowing possession; it does not
require as an element of the offense that the defendant initiated the

possessory act.13 4
NFIB gives rise to a new constitutional question in cases of this
kind. The question is this: Once a person learns of the holding of
contraband that the person involuntarily acquired, must that person
take affirmative steps to get rid of it to avoid prosecution for the possessory crime? In the wake of NFIB, defendants will argue that the
answer is no. To require such action, they will say, would impose an
individual mandate in that it would punish the defendant for "doing
nothing."1 35 They have a point. We have just seen why a plausible
argument exists for applying the anti-mandate principle to possessorycrime cases in which defendants acquired drugs innocently because no
prohibition existed when the taking of possession occurred. No apparent reason suggests why that form of innocent acquisition is functionally different from the manner of innocent acquisition present in
our uninvited-delivery cases. The argument for applying the mandate
label thus seems similarly plausible in both settings. 136
There are also several overlaps in applying our four-factor review
to the two cases. To begin with, each case seems to involve pure inescapability and a resulting inoperativeness of the relatedness factor.
Likewise, in both contexts, there is reason to assume that the degree
of invasiveness is small because dispossessing oneself of drugs or other
contraband seems (at least as a general matter) easy to do. As to
policy sensitivity, cross-cutting considerations are at work. On the one
134 See, e.g., United States v. Sabhnani, 599 F.3d 215, 238 n.13 (2d Cir. 2010) ("[Olne could
violate [the statute] by forming the specific intent to possess the immigration documents of another while having knowing control over them ... without taking any affirmative act."); United
States v. Holloway, 744 F.2d 527, 532 (6th Cir. 1984) (finding that knowing and purposeful possession of heroin, regardless of the manner or purpose of acquisition, was sufficient to establish a
violation of the possession ban set forth in 21 U.S.C. § 844(a)).
135 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2587 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
136 See, e.g., Yung, supra note 85, at 852 (suggesting, among other things, that finding the
minimum coverage provision unconstitutional would raise difficulties in prosecuting persons
who "come to acquire marijuana plants on their property simply by natural forces" if such a
person "does not take action to destroy the illegal plants" after learning of their presence); see
also Weiner, supra note 10, at 86 n.66 (in assessing the constitutionality of a hypothesized environmental law, asserting that "[h]aving a chimney is not 'activity' under any common meaning of
the word").
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hand, unlike in Schmoeky-type situations, cases of uninvited possession never arise out of the voluntary acquisition of a now-banned
item. Ridding oneself of contraband in these cases thus does not call
for-as was the case with Schmoeky-throwing away the fruits of
one's innocently-expended, hard-earned cash. On the other hand, the
person caught in the law's web in uninvited-possession cases has no
choice but to take possession of the goods, whereas the acquirer of the
later-illegalized items in Schmoeky-type cases at least acted voluntarily in taking possession before the prohibition took hold. What is
more, as we have seen, this distinction could have particular significance in a case such as Schmoeky's, on the ground that he might reasonably have foreseen the government's later decision to outlaw
chemo-pot.137
Fact-specific complications may also arise. For example, disposal
of contraband will be distinctively problematic in some uninvited-delivery cases-as when receipt of the banned goods comes from a violence-prone acquaintance who might later seek to reclaim them. As a
general rule, however, cases that involve application of possession
bans in the uninvited-delivery context appear to be unlikely candidates for successful invocation of the NFIB anti-mandate principle.
As we have seen, courts might well conclude that these cases do not
involve application of a mandate at all. 38 And if courts do find a mandate to be operating, they might emphasize (as in Raich) the need to
ensure the effectiveness of companion purchase and sale prohibitions,139 especially because no "investment-backed expectations" are
in the picture. 140
C.

Limits on the Federal Takings Power
In Kelo v. City of New London,141 the Supreme Court divided

sharply on an issue that aroused intense public reaction: Can the government force a private citizen to surrender her home-even for just
compensation-to provide land for a private development project designed to broaden the employment and tax base of an economically
depressed community?142 In the case, Susette Kelo argued that this
form of forced transfer, in effect from one private person to another,
See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
139 See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
140 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123-31 (1978) (focusing
on this consideration in applying the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause).
141 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
142 See id. at 472.
137

138
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did not qualify as a "public use" for purposes of the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause. In a five-to-four decision, however, the Court
disagreed, thus holding that no unconstitutional taking had

occurred. 1 43
At first glance, Kelo seems far-removed from the health care
case. But first glances can be deceiving. To begin with, the Court in
Kelo dealt with a forced transfer of land by an objecting homeowner,
and so conventional understanding suggests that the case involved an
individual mandate. Put another way, it seems very strange to describe the government's action in Kelo as imposing a prohibitionthat is, a prohibition on the homeowner's continued ownership of the
homeowner's own home. To be sure, Kelo itself did not bring into
play the commerce-power-driven anti-mandate principle because the
compelled transfer in that case was undertaken by an arm of a staterather than the federal-government. Takings undertaken pursuant
to congressional authorization, however, are at least potentially subject to the anti-mandate principle, even if they are not subject to a
Fifth Amendment challenge because of Kelo's accommodating treatment of the public use requirement.
Moreover, federal authorities might well pursue the taking of
property to facilitate private development efforts. Consider, for example, a federally ordered surrender of homes located on land
targeted by the federal government to facilitate the building of a privately owned nuclear power plant; to put in place an industrial park to
support the operations of such a nuclear power plant or some other
multistate business operation; or to make way for construction of a
privately owned factory, shipping hub, or major office-building complex to kick-start interstate trade (much as was the case in Kelo itself).144 Given Kelo, any one of these programs should satisfy the
"public use" requirement of the Fifth Amendment. Also, under modern Commerce Clause doctrine, each of these programs could be seen
as involving "economic activity" that substantially affects interstate
commerce, thus satisfying traditional pre-NFIB commerce power requirements. 145 But would the forced transfer of homes by their pri143

See id. at 484.

144

See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.

See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 15-22 (2005) ("Our case law firmly establishes Congress' power to regulate purely local activities that are part of an economic 'class of activities'
that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce."). In addition, even if such mandates were
deemed to target something other than "economic activity," thus rendering them unjustifiable
under a typical post-Lopez application of the "substantial effects" test, they might be deemed
145
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vate-citizen owners qualify as an individual mandate that is
constitutionally out of bounds under NFIB?
Not surprisingly, defenders of the ACA's individual mandate argued that its challengers should fail because the Court had long countenanced mandates in the form of federal takings implemented
pursuant to the commerce power-for example, to facilitate the building of roads and canals.146 In dealing with this argument, the four joint
opinion writers employed some fancy analytical footwork. In effect,
they asserted that a taking of property does not involve an individual
mandate because it operates in rem (that is, against the property),
rather than in personam (that is, against the individual).1 4 7 This line of
reasoning, if read for all it is worth, would exempt Kelo-type takings
from attack under NFIB on the theory that such takings involve in
rem actions against homeowners' properties no less than the most orthodox exercises of the power of eminent domain. In other words, if
the principle of NFIB focuses on whether property condemnations are
in their nature in rem (rather than in personam) proceedings, then the
sort of use for which the taken property is condemned-that is, for
roads or canals and the like, or for commerce-stimulating private development as in Kelo-should be beside the point.
But there is no guarantee that either the current Court or a future
Court would read this in rem reasoning for all that it is worth. Neither
the Chief Justice nor the joint opinion writers declared that every exercise of the eminent domain power that satisfies the now-embracing
"public use" standard under the Fifth Amendment is exempt from invalidation under NFIB's. anti-mandate principle. In a later case, the
Court therefore might say that any otherwise applicable in rem exception to the anti-mandate principle of NFIB simply does not apply to
takings that in effect force one private party to transfer property to
another private party. Alternatively, the Court might say that, even if
Kelo-type takings have an in rem character, they still can fail to qualify as "proper" exercises of the Necessary and Proper Clause.148 The
bottom line is this: Many Americans sense that the sort of growthstimulating takings exemplified by Kelo differ in a qualitative way
from more traditional condemnations undertaken, for example, to
build a bridge or a park, or even to do away with "blighted urban
defensible as permissibly "necessary and proper" steps for pursuing the larger federal project.
See id. at 36-37 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
146 See, e.g., Hall, supra note 17, at 1856-57 (raising this argument).
147 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2649 n.3 (2012) (joint dissent).
148 See supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
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areas." 4 9 Building on this idea, the Court might jump at the chance to
invoke NFIB to restrict Kelo-type takings undertaken by the federal
government.150
So what about Kelo-type takings and our four-factor analysis?
As to escapability, one could say that every acquirer of land (or perhaps every acquirer of any kind of property) takes title with the
knowledge that the government might later condemn it. But it surely
was not on Ms. Kelo's radar screen when she took title to her house
that the City of New London would later force her to sell it so that a
major pharmaceutical firm could build a sprawling business complex
in the area. To say that mandates of this sort are escapable because
would-be land buyers can choose never to buy land is a bit like saying
that bad experiences are escapable because one can choose to live in a
bubble. Thus, except in extraordinary cases, the argument for characterizing a Kelo-type land-transfer mandate as inescapable is strong as
a matter of conventional understanding.151
What about invasiveness? In cases of this kind, the magnitude of
invasiveness will often be of the highest order. Kelo itself involved the
taking of a person's home, and the Court has often recognized the
deep connection between one's home and one's identity and autonomy. 15 2 In addition, the forced loss of one's home-and the intangible
sense of security and connectedness it engenders-may not be susceptible to meaningful recompense,'15 3 particularly when the law requires
the government to pay no more than market value as "just compensa149 See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 34-36 (1954) (upholding such takings as consistent
with the public use requirement); see also Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 497-501
(2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (distinguishing the taking in Kelo from takings to create public
ownership or relieve blight).
150 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2587 n.5 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (suggesting that a distinction
may exist between "a commercial transaction between the landowner and the Government" and
"a government-compelled transaction between the landowner and a third party").
151 See id. at 2621 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (describing land
owners subjected to government takings as "inactive").
152 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (emphasizing the "extent of the
liberty at stake" when laws reach into "the most private of places, the home"); O'Bannon v.
Town Court Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773, 792 & n.2 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasizing the "substantial force" of asserted property interests in a home and the
historically significant role of the home at the "center" of the interests protected by due process
protections); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (recognizing the "drastic invasion of
personal liberties guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments" effected by the enforcement of otherwise justifiable obscenity statutes when the enforcement "reach[es] into the privacy
of one's own home").
153 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 521 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[N]o compensation is possible for
the subjective value of these lands to the individuals displaced and the indignity inflicted by
uprooting them from their homes.").
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tion."154 As a result, at least in cases that involve the taking of an
individual's home, the argument for characterizing the government's
action as involving a significant measure of invasiveness carries much
weight.
Policy sensitivity also may present a problem for federal authorities in cases of this kind. To begin with, Kelo-type takings are probably unusual at the federal level, thus reinforcing the suggestion that
the homeowner will have had no meaningful notice at the time of
purchase that a later compelled dispossession might occur.155 On the
other hand, the government will argue that such takings may pave the
way for generating wide-ranging public benefits.15 6 But skeptics will
respond-as did Justice Thomas in Kelo itself-that Kelo-style takings
tend to place the greatest burdens on poor citizens and racial minorities, while benefitting the politically savvy and well-heeled mega-corporations.157 There is no way to know how these cross-cutting
considerations will play out in the end. But it would come as no surprise if the five Justices who joined together to rein in the commerce
power in NFIB sought one day to leverage that precedent to cut down
on Kelo's impact at the federal level.
IV.

CONDITIONAL MANDATES

Federal law requires persons to take many actions they do not
wish to take. Environmental laws require polluters to install abatement equipment.ss Workplace safety laws require factories to file accident reports.159 Consumer protection laws require pharmacies to
154 See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373-74 (1943) (noting that "just compensation," for Takings Clause purposes, means "fair market value").
155 See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
156 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 483-89 (noting the longstanding judicial practice of "affording
legislatures broad latitude in determining what public needs justify the use of the takings
power," by deferring to government decisions "as to what lands it needs" to further the public
interest).
157 See id. at 521-22 (Thomas, J., dissenting). This argument builds on United States v.
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), which recognized the possibility of a "more searching judicial inquiry" for legislation directed at "discrete and insular minorities" otherwise confronted with special difficulties in protecting themselves via the normal "political processes." Id.
at 152 n.4.
158 See, e.g., EPA Air Programs Rule, 40 C.F.R. § 62.14356 (2013); see also Driesen, supra
note 17 ("[T]he government has the authority to order a company to install a pollution control
device. Does use of this authority compel a firm ... to become a market participant against their
will in violation of the health care ruling?").

159 See, e.g., OSHA Recording and Reporting Occupational Injuries and Illnesses Rule, 29
C.F.R. §§ 1904.4-.7, .46 (2013).
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label prescription drugs.1 60 Gun laws require sellers to undertake
background checks. 6 1 Securities laws require disclosure of information that is material to investment decisions.162 Product safety laws
require recalls of dangerous items.16 3 And on and on.

The challengers of the ACA argued that all of these measures
were distinguishable from the individual mandate because none of
them operated to create commerce;164 instead, each of these laws
targeted persons that were "already" engaged in commercial transactions. 165 Chief Justice Roberts's opinion sounded in the same key. He
reasoned that "[t]he language of the Constitution reflects the natural
understanding that the power to regulate assumes there is already
something to be regulated." 6 6 Thus: "As expansive as our cases construing the scope of the commerce power have been, they all have one
thing in common: They uniformly describe the power as reaching 'activity.'" 6 7 Put another way, if the federal government conditions the
operation of a mandate on engaging in commercial activity of some
sort, the case for applying any anti-mandate rule is greatly weakened.
In short, conditional mandates, if they qualify as mandates at all, are
in their nature very different from, and more defensible than, unconditional mandates.
But just how different and more defensible? Some observers
might suppose that the distinction reaches so far as to save all conditional mandates, at least if their operation is triggered by engagement
in commercial activity. 1 68 For many analysts, however, it will not work
to say that any act of participating in commerce opens the door to the
imposition of any federal contractual mandate.169 Indeed, NFIB itself
160 See, e.g., FDA Labeling Rule, 21 C.F.R. §§ 201.50-58 (2013).

161 See, e.g., ATF Firearms and Ammunition Rule, 27 C.F.R. § 478.102 (2014).
162 See, e.g., SEC Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2013).
163 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2064(c)-(d) (2012); see also Consumer Product Safety Commission
Substantial Product Hazard Reports Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 1115.25 (2014).
164 See State Brief, supra note 12, at 21-22 (distinguishing a law that "simply compels individuals to enter into commerce" from the many "provisions regulating the conduct of individuals
who engage in commercial transactions").
165 See id. at 7-8 (suggesting that an "already-existing activity or undertaking" is "a prerequisite to the exercise of commerce power" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
166 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2586 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (emphasis added).
167 Id. at 2587.
168 See, e.g., Ann Carlson, Another (Mostly) Uninformed Post About the Health Care Cases
and Environmental Law, LEGAL PLANET (June 28, 2012), http://legalplanet.wordpress.com/2012/

06/28/another-mostly-uninformed-post-about-the-health-care-cases-and-environmental-law/
(arguing that NFIB should not jeopardize environmental laws because they "don't force people into
commerce; instead they attempt to regulate the negative consequences of commerce").
169 See, e.g., Dawn Reeves, Health Care Ruling to Spur Challenges to EPA Air Act Penalty
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is hard to square with this result, because not all insurance-eschewing
individuals are subject to the penalty put in place by the ACA; rather
(as was noted before), individuals are subject to the individual mandate only if they engage in commerce in such a way that they generate
a base level of annual income.170 Given this feature of the statute, the
health care case seems to establish that not every act by which a person opts into commercial activity suffices to subject that person to any
form of federal mandate. Common sense supports the same conclusion because few of us never enter into commerce at all. Thus, unless
some principle limits the government's power to impose mandates on
persons based simply on their participation in commerce, Congress
could render the anti-mandate holding of NFIB a dead letter by tying
any mandate (including a mandate to purchase health insurance) to
the acquisition of food, water, transportation, or goods or services of
any kind.171
Recognizing that some conditional mandates will run afoul of the
limiting principle of NFIB raises a rich variety of questions because it
opens up the possibility of constitutional challenges to many federal
statutes and regulations. Here, as elsewhere, predicting the path of
the law is tricky. But the ground already covered in this Article suggests the ways in which courts will approach these questions-that is,
by focusing on escapability, relatedness, invasiveness, and policy
sensitivity.
A.

All-But-Inescapable Mandates

Some conditional mandates imposed on individuals are almost
certain to run afoul of NFIB's limiting rule. Consider the famously
hypothesized-and unconditional-broccoli-purchase mandate.172
The five-Justice majority on the commerce power issue was confident
Process, INSIDEEPA.com (June 28, 2012), http://insideepa.com/Inside-EPA-General/InsideEPA-Public-Content/health-care-ruling-to-spur-challenges-to-epa-air-act-penalty-process/menuid-565.html ("[Clonservative legal scholars now say the ruling could drive challenges to Clean
Air Act provisions ....
); Jonathan Zasloff, The Health Care Cases: Instant Uninformed Reaction!!, LEGAL PLANET (June 28, 2012), http://legalplanet.wordpress.com/2012/06/28/the-healthcare-cases-instant-uninformed-reaction/ (suggesting that "[e]nvironmental lawyers will need to
look at this decision very carefully" because, as to environmental regulations, it remains to be
seen "[hiow much the opinion cuts these things back").
170 See supra notes 86, 90 and accompanying text.
171 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2648 (joint dissent) (noting that "it is inevitable that each American will affect commerce and become a part of it, even if not by choice").
172 See id. at 2624 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing "the
broccoli horrible"); see also notes 38, 54 and accompanying text.
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that Congress could not enact such a law,'173 and even the four-Justice
minority seemed sympathetic to this position.174 This unconditional
broccoli-purchase law, however, could easily be transformed into a
conditional mandate. Would a "you-must-buy-broccoli" federal law
become constitutional, for example, if Congress applied it only to persons who purchase groceries?
Any effort to answer this question must begin with a recognition
that this conditional mandate-precisely because it is a conditional
mandate-does not have the characteristic of pure inescapability. Individuals might evade this version of the broccoli-purchase requirement, for instance, by growing food at home or eating out for every
meal. Even so, the mandate is marked by an extremely low level of
escapability. The critical fact is that nearly all of us buy groceries and
have no real choice but to do so. 175 As a result, it smacks of overreaching to say that Congress may freely impose the mandate on its
intended targets (that is, virtually all citizens of the United States) because they have voluntarily injected themselves into the commercial
sphere of purchasing food products. 176 Put another way, at least with
respect to escapability, a mandate placed on all individuals who buy
groceries seems all but identical to a mandate placed on everyone. So,
if a mandate to buy broccoli made applicable to everyone lies beyond
the federal power, it would seem to follow that such a mandate is unconstitutional-or at least presumptively so-even though it applies
"only" to grocery buyers.
There is, however, an argument for upholding the all-but-inescapable conditional broccoli-purchase mandate that springs from our
second analytical touchstone-that is, the touchstone of relatedness.
This argument is available in part because the ACA's challengers
made a significant concession: They never disputed the government's
claim that the federal government could require actual buyers of
health care services to pay for those services with insurance, as opposed to paying with cash or credit cards or cows. In other words, the
173 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2591 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (criticizing the government's
efforts to distinguish the purchasing of "broccoli" and the purchasing of "health insurance"); id.
at 2650 (joint dissent) (reasoning that the failure to purchase health insurance and the failure to
purchase broccoli both qualify as "inactivities" that Congress cannot regulate).
174 See, e.g., id. at 2624-25 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (distinguishing the broccoli-mandate statute without defending Congress's power to enact it).
175 Id. at 2590 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) ("Everyone will likely participate in the markets
for food . . . ."); id. at 2648 (joint dissent) ("[T]he mere fact that we all consume food and are
thus, sooner or later, participants in the 'market' for food, does not empower the Government to
say when or what we will buy.").
176 See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
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law's challengers accepted the constitutionality of at least one mandate-type law that was unquestionably conditional-that is, a federal
law that compelled payment with insurance whenever an individual
secures health care services.177 Notably, this hypothesized mandate
carried with it a very high level of inescapability. Indeed, one of the
federal government's central arguments in NFIB was that the hypothesized must-pay-with-insurance mandate was not functionally distinguishable from the actual must-acquire-insurance-even-now mandate
because, as a practical matter, everyone would have to pay for medical
care at some future time. 178
In rejecting the government's argument, the majority in effect
found these two laws (that is, a law that requires paying for health
services with insurance and a law that requires simply acquiring health
insurance) to be distinguishable on relatedness grounds. In particular,
both the Chief Justice and the joint opinion writers suggested that a
mandate to buy insurance was only loosely tethered to buying health
care services because the insurance buyer might never actually secure
such services, or at least might not secure them for a long time.179 In
contrast, a requirement that a patient pay for a particular provision of
medical care with insurance is directly related to the patient's engagement in commerce because it is a part of the very commercial transaction that triggers the duty to pay. If we were looking to label this
relationship, we might say that the pay-with-insurance mandate is
marked by transactional relatedness because the condition and the
duty are part of the very same transaction. In the eyes of all the parties in the health care case, this extremely close form of relatedness
between the triggering event (acquiring health care services) and the
mandate (to pay for those very services by way of insurance) rendered
177 See, e.g., State Brief, supra note 12, at 25 (noting a "critical difference between a mandate that individuals obtain insurance and a mandate that individuals who obtain health care
services use insurance when they do so"); Oral Argument, supra note 107, at 55-57 (conceding
that Congress could require payment by way of insurance when an individual secures emergency
room services).
178 See Oral Argument, supra note 107, at 12 ("[AIII this minimum coverage provision does
is say that, instead of requiring insurance at the point of sale, that Congress has the authority
under thecommerce power . .. to ensure that people have insurance in advance of the point of
sale because . . . virtually everybody in society is in this market.").
179 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2589-90 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (rejecting the government's
"active in the market" theory by asserting that "[t]he individual mandate's regulation of the
uninsured as a class is . . . divorced from any link to existing commercial activity" (internal
quotation marks omitted)); id. at 2647-48 (joint dissent) (rejecting the government's "essentially
universal participation" argument as "not true" because "the Individual Mandate ... principally
consists of goods and services that . . . young people . . . do not purchase" (internal quotation

marks omitted)).
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this hypothesized mandate a permissible exercise of the commerce
power, even though it was highly inescapable.180 And it might seem to
follow from this analysis that all conditional mandates marked by
transactional relatedness will escape the anti-mandate principle.
Most of them will. There is reason to believe, however, that the
Court will not travel all the way down this road. What if, for example,
Congress passed a law that required everyone who leases housing to
secure health insurance for-but only for-the period of the lease?
Would such a law be distinguishable from the law found to exceed the
commerce power in NFIB because it is marked by transactional relatedness? Some analysts will conclude that the answer is no because
housing and health insurance have very little to do with one another.
Indeed, one line of argument put forward by the respondents in NFIB
was that Congress could not tie the present purchase of health insurance to the future acquisition of health care services because health
care services and health insurance are sold in different markets.18'
The same thing can be said a fortiori about health care insurance and
housing. In short, it is far from clear that the presence of transactional
relatedness will always work to place a challenged mandate outside
the limiting principle of NFIB.
What if a mandate is marked by both transactional relatedness
and the imposition of a duty to engage in a transaction in the same
market the buyer has entered? This question circles us back to our
buy-broccoli-when-you-buy-groceries mandate. Many of us will recoil
in horror at the thought of such a law. But this measure is marked by
both transactional relatedness and same-market features. In other
words, if a "same market" test is decisive when transactional relatedness is present, then our you-must-buy-broccoli-when-you-buy-groceries mandate would seem to pass constitutional muster. The critical
point is that broccoli is sold in the retail food market. In particularand unlike with housing and health insurance-broccoli is a potential
substitute for other groceries, and vice versa. Thus, one might say
that, notwithstanding its high degree of inescapability, our conditional
broccoli-purchase mandate is constitutional under the same-market/
different-market logic that the challengers of the ACA's individual
mandate themselves advanced. 182
180
181

See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
See State Brief, supra note 12, at 25 ("The mandate neither addresses the 'health care

services' market nor regulates the method of financing purchases in that market.").
182

See supra note 181.
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Overhanging this analysis, however, are two significant complications. First, it may be that broccoli is not traded in the same marketat least in a strong sense-as many other foods-for example,
Cheetos or Cap'n Crunch. Second, even if a court concludes that
broccoli and other groceries are sold in the same market, that fact
alone may not provide the best indicator of relatedness for purposes
of the four-factor test. Rather, the operative inquiry might more
soundly focus on whether the mandate (here, to buy broccoli) has a
connection to the activity that triggers that mandate (here, to buy groceries) in the sense that there is a relation between the two things
based on fairness, logic, or the like. From this perspective, there is
reason to question the presence of strong relatedness in a mandate to
buy broccoli that is conditioned on buying groceries. After all, even if
the government sees fit to attach a same-market mandate to the
purchase of food, why should it single out broccoli as vegetable-inchief? What useful purpose does the forced acquisition of this one
food source serve? Will the acquisition of this legally celebrated item
advance the government's purpose in some meaningful respect? 183
Put another way, the requirement that individuals pay cash for broccoli whenever they buy groceries has a bizarre and random quality.
And it is that quality that raises red flags about the presence of functional relatedness between optional grocery buying in general and
mandated broccoli buying in particular.
With regard to invasiveness, our conditional broccoli-purchase
mandate presents a mixed bag. On the one hand, this mandate raises
much the same problem of invasiveness as did the minimum coverage
provision because it, too, compels the purchase of an "unwanted product."184 Indeed, the magnitude of the affront to liberty may be heightened in the broccoli case, in part because people forced to buy
broccoli might have little practical choice, in light of financial constraints, but to eat the broccoli they have purchased. And if that is the
case, legal norms that stand against government efforts to dictate what
one puts in one's body might come into play.185 On the other hand,
persons compelled to buy broccoli when they buy groceries do not
have to enter an entirely new realm of commerce in a way that forces
183 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2623-24 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(questioning the soundness, and the analogousness to the ACA's individual mandate, of the
hypothetical "vegetable-purchase mandate" because of the "chain of inferences" required "to
conclude that [it is] likely to have a substantial effect on . . . health-care costs").
184 See id. at 2586 & n.3 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2648-50 & n.2 (joint dissent).
185 See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990) (citing "constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition").
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them to incur an entirely new set of significant expenditures. Rather
(and precisely because broccoli and other foods are sold in the same
market), food buyers who must put broccoli in their carts might be
seen as merely having to swap out one food purchase for another.
Nor are broccoli buyers legally compelled to eat broccoli if they do
not want to; they retain the right to discard it or to sell it to their
neighbors.
A look at policy responsiveness also discloses conflicting signals
as to constitutionality. Dieticians might claim that even a modest effort in the direction of creating nutritional balance in food buying reflects a reasonable-if not critical-reform to our public health
laws. 18 6 Critics will respond, however, that such exercises in paternalism are unlikely to increase public health; instead, their primary effect
will be to undermine greatly public respect for the law. The singling
out of broccoli also raises suspicions about the sort of naked interestgroup favoritism-here, favoritism for broccoli farmers-at which our
law looks askance.187
Whatever one concludes about all of this, we are left with the
same intuition with which this analysis began: It is hard to imagine
that the same five Justices who decried an unconditional broccolipurchase mandate would place their stamp of approval on a broccolipurchase mandate conditioned on the act of grocery buying. We cannot know just how the Court would explain its placement of the unconditional and conditional broccoli-purchase mandates in the same
basket. But, almost surely, the all-but-inescapable character of a grocery-getters-must-buy-broccoli law would figure in its rationale.
B.

"Back Door" Individual Mandates

Let us assume that we are correct in positing that the current Supreme Court would not uphold a federal law that mandates grocery
buyers to include broccoli on their shopping lists. A Congress hellbent on promoting broccoli purchases might seek to develop a workaround that achieves the same result in a different way. One possibility would be to place a mandate on sellers rather than buyers. Federal
186 See, e.g., NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2588 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) ("[M]any Americans do not
eat a balanced diet. . . . The failure of that group to have a healthy diet increases health care
costs[ ] to a greater extent than the failure of the uninsured to purchase insurance." (citing Eric
A. Finkelstein et al., Annual Medical Spending Attributable to Obesity: Payer- and Service-Specific Estimates, 28 HEALTH AFFAIRS w822 (2009))).
187 See Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1689,
1693-95 (1984) (distinguishing political choices based on "naked preferences"-or "raw political
power"-from those that are based on "public values").
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law, after all, requires many sellers to honor minimum quality standards with regard to the products they market. Car makers and dealers, for example, must include seatbelts in the vehicles they sell.188
Building on this idea, could Congress require all grocery sellers to include one crown of broccoli in every package of food they purvey?
The hypothesized law on which this question focuses might seem farfetched. But variations on the law, as we soon shall see, are not farfetched at all, thus rendering it advisable to consider the question with
care.
At an intuitive level, it seems likely that the Court that recoiled at
a compelled-broccoli-purchase law would likewise look unkindly on
this newfangled broccoli-sale mandate. No less important, these intuitions have a solid grounding in business realities. Those realities suggest that thus-regulated sellers would respond to such a law by simply
raising other prices to make up for the "free" broccoli transfers the
law requires them to make; and buyers-who have no practical choice
but to acquire groceries-would then have to pay those added costs as
a practical matter. Put another way, this law might impose a de jure
sales mandate on grocery sellers, but it would impose a de facto
purchase mandate on grocery buyers. And if this de facto purchase
mandate is unconstitutional, how far down the slippery slope does that
conclusion take us?
Congress, while unlikely to enact a stores-must-put-broccoli-inthe-grocery-bag mandate, might enact other mandates that critics will
say are functionally the same. Seatbelt laws provide an example, although courts are likely to distinguish them by reasoning (among
other things) that people do not have to buy cars in the same way they
have to buy groceries.189 But what about, for example, product-quality mandates associated with the sale or leasing of homes? Are such
mandates more like our law that impermissibly requires the inclusion
of broccoli in grocery bags or more like the law that permissibly requires the inclusion of seatbelts in cars?
Assume that the federal government required all newly sold or
rented homes to include smoke detectors. Perhaps courts would conclude that such a law is a permissible exercise of the commerce power
188

49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (2013).

189 See Oral Argument, supra note 107, at 90 (arguing that Congress may mandate antipol-

lution devices on cars for those who have "entered the market" but may not "compel [one] to
enter the market"). But see Posner, supra note 74 (highlighting the functional inescapability of
duties imposed on drivers, because forcing Americans not to drive to avoid such duties is akin to
forcing Americans to "cut off their feet in order to escape sales tax on shoes").
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because it targets commercial actors that have "already" entered into
commerce by choosing to market residential property. In doing so,
however, those courts would have to deal with the must-sell-broccoli
mandate (which likewise targets persons "already" selling groceries)
and the predictable assertion that (in contrast to the situation with
automobiles) everyone must secure housing, much as everyone must
secure food. Again, the point is that the law concerning smoke detectors-though technically directed at housing transferors-might be
said to impose a de facto mandate on "nearly. .. all citizens," because
almost every citizen is a housing transferee and any government-imposed costs imposed on those who market residential properties inevitably are passed on to buyers and lessees. 190
Laws of this kind could reach beyond smoke detectors. They
might involve the compulsory pre-sale or pre-rental installation of
types of insulation, glass, piping, or flooring that meet exacting quality
standards.191 They might also include items, such as fire extinguishers,
that are not built into the dwelling itself. In each case, the argument is
predictable that-as with broccoli that a grocer must hypothetically
include in food sales-housing transferees are in practical effect being
mandated to pay out money for "an unwanted product." 1 9 2 And time
and again, it was emphasized in NFIB that "realities," rather than "labels," should govern constitutional analysis.19 3
It is not clear how courts will deal with future claims that federal
laws nominally targeted at sellers impose backdoor mandates on individual purchasers. There is strong reason to think, however, that
courts will not invoke NFIB to strike down federally imposed product-quality standards as a general rule. 194 Assuming such laws are
seen as imposing mandates at all, most of them are escapable, as our
190 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2644 (joint dissent).
191 See supra notes 158-67 and accompanying text (discussing federal authority to impose
mandates on entities already engaged in business operations).
192 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2586 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
193 See id. at 2595 (majority opinion) (ignoring "'the designation of the exaction, and viewing its substance and application"' in deciding whether to deem it a tax (quoting United States v.
Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 294 (1935))); id. at 2597 (criticizing the view "that even if the Constitution permits Congress to do exactly what [the Court] interpret[s] this statute to do, the law
must be struck down because Congress used the wrong labels" and adding that "labels should
not control").
194 Indeed, eight Justices in the health care case appeared to endorse this conclusion. See
id. at 2620 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing the joint opinion
writers as "recognizing that 'the Federal Government can prescribe [a commodity's] quality"'
(alteration in original) (quoting NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2648 (joint dissent))); id. at 2648 (joint dissent) (noting that, when we buy food, "the Federal Government can prescribe what its quality
must be").
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car seatbelt law illustrates.195 Moreover, product-quality rules virtually always involve a high level of relatedness because they attach a
quality requirement to the very item that the seller is engaged in placing on the market. (In contrast, as we saw earlier, courts might well
say that a broccoli-sale mandate bears only a weak functional relationship to the buying and selling of groceries.196) Product-quality standards also present less invasiveness than the ACA's individual
mandate in one important sense. In the health care case, the Court
encountered a situation in which healthy individuals had to pay abovemarket rates for the insurance policies foisted upon them; indeed, that
was the very purpose of the law. 1 97 No similar problem of expanding
an insurance risk pool-and thus imposing heightened costs on lowrisk buyers-is presented when sellers honor generally applicable
minimum product standards. Finally, in this context more so than in
others, policy sensitivity may play a supportive role. Minimum quality
standards, after all, tend to promote social interests by ensuring that
buyers are not exposed to unreasonable and often hidden risks that
sellers can guard against in an efficient manner. What is more, government-imposed product standards are hardly "novel." 198 To the
contrary, their common and longstanding presence in our law renders
them unsurprising, and thus less harsh of an imposition to direct at
regulated persons.199
C. Mandates Imposed on Workers

One type of individual mandate requires special attention-the
individual mandate imposed on individual workers. Many such mandates will pose no constitutional problem. We have seen, for example,
that a law that requires miners to wear helmets seems unobjectionable
under NFIB because (even assuming it establishes a mandate) all of

the factors that guide analysis in this field cut in favor of its constitutionality. 2 " But how far does the principle of our miner-helmet law
reach? This question turns out to be complex. A basic point, however, is that an important line divides two categories of worker manSee supra notes 188-89 and accompanying text.
See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
197 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2585 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) ("[T]he mandate forces into the
insurance risk pool more healthy individuals, whose premiums on average will be higher than
their health care expenses.").
198 See id. at 2586, 2599.
199 See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
200 See supra notes 90-98 and accompanying text (evaluating the miner-helmet law under
the proposed four-factor analysis).
195

196
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dates. It is the line between those mandates that target specialized
groups of workers (as the miner-helmet law does) and those mandates
that target workers in general (as the miner-helmet law does not). I
briefly consider each such category of laws-a process that brings important implications of NFIB into view.
1.

Targeted Worker Mandates

Consider a familiar feature of federal labor law. The National
Labor Relations Act 2 0 1 permits unions and employers to specify in collective bargaining agreements that nonunion members must make
payments that parallel union dues.2 02 The practical effect of this law is
to force most nonunion members who work in unionized settings to
pay money to unions even though they wish not to do so. Nonetheless, the law probably does not impose a mandate because it focuses
on the proper subjects of private collective bargaining. In other
words, it does not set forth an outright, governmentally imposed mandate that nonunion members must pay so-called "agency fees"; instead, it merely permits private employers to incorporate certain
terms into their contracts with unions.
But what if federal law did directly mandate that all nonunion
workers pay agency fees if they work in unionized settings? Or what
if a court concluded that in practical effect-and thus for controlling
constitutional purposes-existing federal labor law imposes such a
fee-payment mandate? Under our four-factor analysis, escapability is
present, just as it is with the miner-helmet law, because no one has to
work in a unionized shop. (To be sure, this argument may be weakened in some settings-for example, when a plant is unionized only
after nonunion members have built up many years of seniority. But
the same dynamic might well operate with regard to the miner-helmet
law, and in other settings in which new rules impose previously unexpected burdens on long-employed workers.) The relatedness factor
also supports constitutionality, especially because transactional relatedness marks this posited mandate; after all, any fee-payment requirement directed at the nonunion member would operate only so long as
that employee worked in the unionized facility. (On the other hand,
as we have seen, transactional relatedness does not necessarily reNational Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2012).
See Commc'ns Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 745-63 (1988) (authorizing the
exaction of fees from nonunion members for the union's "perform[ance of] the duties of an
exclusive representative of the employees in dealing with the employer on labor-management
issues").
201

202
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move all problems under the anti-mandate principle. 203 But transactional relatedness is supplemented in this setting with logical
relatedness, in light of the services the union effectively provides to all
workers, including nonmembers.) Invasiveness also poses only a limited problem in this case, at least if one accepts the premise that dueslike payments generate a reciprocal benefit for nonunion members.
(One might respond that a reciprocal benefit was also present in the
health care case, but the reciprocal benefit provided under the ACA
was arguably smaller because in effect it compelled full-cost purchases
even by buyers who had only the most limited need for health care
services. 204)
Finally, for two separate reasons, policy sensitivity may support
the constitutionality of even an outright mandate that nonunion members pay agency fees. First, the interests of nonunion members in
avoiding burdensome payment obligations will be vicariously represented by union members who share that same interest. Second, the
must-pay rule addresses obvious and serious free-rider problems. (On
the other hand, free-rider problems were also present in NFIB.205 ) In
the end, this discussion of a must-pay-union-dues rule seems to reinforce the take-away from our earlier analysis of the miner-helmet
case-namely, that courts should and will be hesitant to apply the
anti-mandate principle to work-related laws that target only those individuals who choose to ply their trade in a particular setting.206
2.

General Worker Mandates

A different calculus comes into play when laws target workers in
general. Assume, for example, that in crafting the ACA, Congress
had specified that only (but all) persons who hold jobs must acquire
health insurance for themselves and their families. Would this tweak
have saved the individual mandate from the dustbin of failed commerce power experiments?
Offering support for a finding of constitutionality is the fact that
this version of the individual mandate lacks the characteristic of pure
inescapability; rather, it is escapable in the sense that only those who
choose to work come within its grasp. Even so, this mandate poses a
much greater problem with regard to escapability than is posed, for
See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
205 See supra notes 25, 56 and accompanying text.
206 See supra notes 90-98 and accompanying text (explaining why the miner-helmet law
would fare positively under the escapability and relatedness factors).
203
204
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example, by the miner-helmet law. The reason is that individuals can
choose with little difficulty not to work in mining or any other particular field. But it is not easy for most of us to forego work altogether.
As a result, any mandate that extends to all workers raises special
problems as to escapability. Indeed, some commentators seem to
have assumed that courts will treat mandates that are imposed on all
or most workers the same as mandates that are imposed on

everyone. 2 07
Questions about relatedness also await our hypothesized workers-must-buy-health-insurance law. On the one hand, transactional
relatedness marks this measure because the worker must retain insurance only so long as the worker holds a job. In addition, as a matter
of common understanding, the acquisition of health insurance is often
connected with employment, 208 and there are logical reasons why this
is so. For example, having health insurance may enhance employee
productivity by fostering the use of preventive care, by minimizing
family disruptions attributable to poor health, and by reducing lost
work days when illness or injury strikes. On the other hand, there are
reasons to question the presence of strong relatedness in this setting.
Some courts might say that selling labor occurs in one market and
buying insurance occurs in another-especially when the insurancepurchase obligation goes so far as to become a whole-family affair.
Critics also might claim that the functional connection between having
health insurance and having a job is more attenuated than (for example) the obvious functional connection between wearing a helmet and
working in a mine.
The invasiveness of our workers-must-get-health-insurance mandate is significant because it involves the forced purchase of the very
same product involved in NFIB itself. The minimum coverage provision and our hypothesized workers-must-get-health-insurance mandate also present similar concerns with regard to policy sensitivity
because in each there is a danger that the must-insure mandate will
discourage productive activity. Indeed, a mandate triggered by employment seems even more problematic from this perspective than the
mandate triggered by income generation at issue in NFIB. This is so
207 See, e.g., Graetz & Mashaw, supra note 12, at 309 (suggesting that "[miandatory personal accounts . . . for all workers" could be accomplished after NFIB "only indirectly through
the Taxing and Spending Clauses"). See generally infra note 237 (collecting authorities that raise
questions about privatized social security systems).
208 See Katie Thomas, Self-Insured Complicate Health Deal, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 16, 2012, at
B1 (indicating that "most large employers" and "religiously affiliated organizations" provide
insurance directly to their employees).
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because the job-related mandate does not attach to securing income in
any way whatsoever (including by sitting on a couch as passive interest
income rolls in); instead, that mandate attaches a burden directly to,
and thus may discourage one pointedly from, the very act of working.
On balance, there are strong reasons to conclude that generally
applicable worker mandates should typically escape invalidation
under NFIB's anti-mandate principle. By taking paid positions, after
all, workers both engage in a commercial exchange and undertake to
promote their employer's commerce-related activity. Meanwhile, arguments based on inescapability and policy sensitivity will always be
in tension in this context, because the strong general desire to secure
work (as posited by the argument related to inescapability) suggests
that would-be employees will not shun jobs because of conditional duties (as posited by the argument related to policy sensitivity). In addition, one key element of the argument for the validity of these laws
based on the relatedness factor simultaneously operates to hold down
problems of invasiveness. Why? Because the sort of transactional relatedness present in these cases renders the costs imposed by the mandate operative only while an individual is gainfully employed and
therefore best positioned to take those burdens on. Finally, here as
elsewhere, the attachment of federal duties to the taking of employment is a matter that is far from "novel"-as evidenced by the longstanding operation of the Social Security system and federal labor
laws in general. 209
Even so, the possibility that some courts will apply the anti-mandate principle in this setting should not be underestimated. Patrons of
limiting federal power, for example, will argue against the constitutionality of the workers-must-buy-health-insurance law on the ground
that the ACA itself operated as a practical matter to lay its burden on
workers. 210 And if the Supreme Court gravitates to this argument,
NFIB could produce sleepless nights for liberals and conservatives
alike. Liberals might come to worry about the constitutionality of
even the federal minimum wage law, 211 while conservatives might find
themselves fretting over new obstacles to the project of privatizing
Social Security.2 12
209

See supra notes 198-99 and accompanying text.

210 See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
211

29 U.S.C. § 206 (2012).

212

See generally Jagadeesh Gokhale, Social Security Reform: Does Privatization Still Make

Sense?, 50 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 169, 189-90 (2013) (discussing the rationale behind privatization).
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The Minimum Wage Mandate

Few analysts would go so far as to say that NFIB renders invalid
the basic duty imposed by the Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA")213-that is, the duty that employers must offer workers a
federally specified minimum hourly wage. 2 14 Challengers of the law,
however, might take a different tack by arguing that the FLSA does
impose an individual mandate because it mandates that individual
workers accept the minimum wage. 215 These critics might note that
our earlier discussion of the conditional you-must-buy-broccoli-withgroceries law suggests that the unlawful-mandate shoe can fit even if
placed on only one term of a larger contractual exchange. 216 Indeed,
they might say that the minimum wage law operates to "create" commerce in an especially problematic sense because at bottom it mandates the transfer of a significant increment of money from one party
to another even though neither of the parties wants to make that com-

mercial transfer at all. 2 17
The problems with this argument are many. First, it seems likely
that the FLSA does not impose a mandate in the first place; rather, it
imposes a prohibition on the deployment of wrongful low-pay contract provisions,218 in keeping with the proposition that general con29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2012).
Id. § 206(a); see Liberty Univ. v. Geithner, 753 F. Supp. 2d 611, 635-36 (W.D. Va. 2010)
("The requirement imposed by the [Affordable Care] Act on employers to offer a minimum
level of health insurance resembles the requirement imposed by the FLSA on employers to offer
a minimum wage . . . . Employers regulated under [the ACA] are already engaged in
commerce ....
).
215 See Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 740 (1981) ("Th[e] Court's
decisions . . . have frequently emphasized the nonwaivable nature of an individual employee's
213 Fair Labor Standards Act,
214

right to a minimum wage . . . under the Act.").
216 One might respond by observing that a mandated payment term in a unitary labor contract differs on its face from the mandated purchase of one identifiable product (broccoli) when
one buys other entirely separate items (say, apples, noodles, potatoes, and ice cream). But it is
not apparent why labor contracts are "unitary" while grocery purchases are not; indeed, the
minimum wage law's challenger will argue that each case involves the same thing-namely, the
forced taking of more of something (more pay in one case and more broccoli in the other) than
one wishes to trade for.
217 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
218 Another helpful analogy may be offered by a set of cases at which we have already
looked-namely, those that involve the many federal laws that require sellers of goods to send
into the marketplace only products that meet minimum quality standards. See supra notes
196-99 and accompanying text. One such law, for example, requires toy sellers to adorn their
products only with non-lead-based paint. 16 C.F.R. § 1303.1 (2013). As a result, toy buyers have
no choice but to secure products that conform to these standards. But few of us would view such
a law as imposing a mandate on buyers, even though buyers cannot "waive" the "right" to obtain
the protections those laws provide. See supra notes 188-89 and accompanying text (discussing
seat belt installation rules).
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tract law often disallows the use of terms that are illegal or contrary to
public policy. 219 In addition, the minimum wage law (which operates
to outlaw certain provisions in a contract that two people voluntarily
make) differs in an obvious way from the minimum coverage provision (which mandates the making of a contract that one party does not
wish to enter into at all). 22 0
Assuming our four-factor analysis nonetheless comes into play,
already identified problems with escapability may well be offset by the
high degree of relatedness that the minimum wage law entails. This
law, after all, embodies transactional relatedness because it operates
only so long as the worker is employed. It also involves a high degree
of functional relatedness because it seeks to create fairness-which is
otherwise at risk because of employers' built-in bargaining advantages-in the very contractual relationships it operates to control. 221
The invasiveness factor supports constitutionality because the whole
point of the law is to ensure that workers get the advantage of more
pay, rather than less pay, for their work. To be sure, some employees
might urge that the FLSA does not help them-because, for example,
they could get more working hours if they were not mandated to take
the minimum wage. But a compelling argument from policy sensitivity cuts the other way: If workers were permitted to waive minimum
wage protections, the entire system could well collapse as a domino
effect of waivers took hold, encouraged (at least implicitly) by selfinterested employers.
Given these considerations, as well as the Supreme Court's longstanding acceptance of the FLSA, many of us will write off any future
NFIB-based challenge to the minimum wage law as outlandish, if not
outrageous. 222 It should not be forgotten, however, that early constitutional attacks on the ACA's individual mandate sparked a similar
chorus of naysaying. 223 At the least, this discussion reveals just how
219 See, e.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH & WILLIAM F. YOUNG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CoNrRACTS § 5.1 (3d ed. 1980).
220 Of particular significance in this regard, a requirement as to how much one charges for
labor seems not far removed from the sort of outright price control that even the four joint
opinion writers viewed as constitutionally permissible. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2648 (2012)
(joint dissent) (noting that Congress "can prescribe ... even how much we must pay" for food).
221 See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 122 (1941) (noting that the minimum wage law
is "directed at the suppression of a method or kind of competition . . . condemned as 'unfair"').
222 See id. at 125 ("[I]t is no longer open to question that the fixing of a minimum wage is
).
within the legislative power ....
223

See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, From off the Wall to on the Wall: How the Mandate Challenge

Went Mainstream, THE ATLArNc (June 4, 2012, 2:55 PM), http://www.theatlantic.cominationall
archive/2012/06/from-off-the-wall-to-on-the-wall-how-the-mandate-challenge-went-mainstream/
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far efforts to apply the Court's anti-mandate principle ruling might be
pushed. Another-and a potentially more fruitful-invocation of the
principle may well gain traction as debate continues to rage over the
privatization of Social Security.
4. Privatizing Social Security and Beyond
Our current Social Security system imposes a mandate-namely,
a mandate that present-day workers pay the government a part of
their wages as the price of enjoying future-day retirement benefits.
Even so, the existing Social Security system is constitutional, albeit
not necessarily under the commerce power. Instead, it is constitutional under the taxing and spending powers because the government
collects Social Security payments as taxes and then pays out program
funds in keeping with statutory requirements. 2 24
Of no small importance, it is precisely this method of operation at
which critics of the Social Security system have taken aim. In recent
decades, leaders ranging from George W. Bush to Mitt Romney to
Paul Ryan have advocated "privatizing" Social Security. 225 These
would-be reformers, however, now face more than only political resistance to their arguments for a new approach. In the aftermath of
NFIB, they also must navigate their way around the Court's new antimandate principle.
There is complexity here, because Congress could move toward
privatization in many ways. If it continued to collect funds from workers and then paid them out either directly to recipients for reinvestment or to designated private-firm account managers, the taxing and
spending powers would seem to support the government program no
less than they do today. Under this sort of revision, after all, the federal government would still collect taxes and still pay out treasury
money, albeit in a modified manner. One can imagine the rejoinder
258040/ (noting that three years prior to the NFIB decision the idea of challenging the mandate
was "simply crazy"); Erwin Chemerinsky, Health Care Reform Is Constitutional,POLMco (Oct.
23, 2009, 4:59 AM), http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=7DFE7C51-18FE-70B2A81B83D9FO9A146F ("Those who object to the health care proposals on constitutional grounds
are making an argument that has no basis in the law."); see also Persily et al., supra note 15, at
1-2 (noting that the "arguments that eventually won a majority of the Court, under the Commerce and Spending Clauses, were barely on the radar screen when the legislation was drafted").
224 See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640-46 (1937).
225 See Nancy J. Altman, The Striking Superiority of Social Security in the Provision of
Wage Insurance, 50 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 109, 149, 152-53 (2013). See generally Michael D. Tanner, Privatizing Social Security: A Big Boost for the Poor, CATO PROJECT ON Soc. SECURITY

CHOICE (July 26, 1996), http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/ssp4.pdf (discussing the
benefits and mechanisms of privatizing social security).
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that such a program would involve only a pretextual use of the taxing
and spending powers, cleverly designed to disguise a government effort simply to force individuals to purchase private retirement-related
services. 2 26 Arguments of this sort, however, confront major obstacles
under existing doctrine, including doctrine laid down in the health
care case itself.2 2 7 Even more important, such a program would continue to involve an expansive on-the-ground role for the federal government in collecting and disbursing funds. Thus, any effort to cast it
as only a sleight-of-hand mandate to launch private business relationships is unlikely to make much headway.228
Congress, however, could also move toward privatization by
abandoning the taxing-and-spending model altogether. Under such a
system, workers would not make payments to the government at all.
Instead, federal law would require them to pay money (most likely via
mandatory paycheck reductions) into privately administered retirement accounts, akin to now-commonplace 401(k) plans, out of which
payments would come back to workers once they reached a statutory
retirement age. Any system of this sort would bear many similarities
to the existing Social Security program: Workers would have to make
contributions, those contributions would plant the seed for the later
receipt of monetary benefits, employers would participate in the system through paycheck reductions and payouts, and entitlements to
benefits would attach upon reaching a landmark birthday. As a legal
matter, however, this substitute system would present constitutional
questions far more problematic than those posed by the existing Social Security program. In particular, it would lack a grounding in the
taxing and spending powers, so that it would have to find its constitutional footing in the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses.
Justifying this program on that theory would present major
problems after NFIB.2 29 The new law, after all, would mandate that
individuals buy retirement fund services from private providers, just
as the ACA mandates that individuals buy insurance services from private firms. To be sure, this retirement fund mandate would cover only
226 See, e.g., supra note 193 and accompanying text (emphasizing the centrality of substance-over-form reasoning in NFIB).
227 See, e.g., NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2596 (2012) ("Some of our earliest federal taxes sought
to deter the purchase of imported manufactured goods in order to foster the growth of domestic
industry."); id. ("Indeed, [elvery tax is in some measure regulatory." (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
228 See id. (finding the ACA's "penalty" to be a tax in part because "the payment is collected solely by the IRS through the normal means of taxation").
229 See infra note 237 (collecting authorities).

1104

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:1052

those persons who inject themselves into commerce by entering into
the labor force. But, as we have seen, that difference may not give
rise to a controlling distinction because not every conditional mandate-and particularly not every work-related mandate-is likely to
dodge constitutional problems under the anti-mandate principle. 23 0
How might a court analyze this form of privatized Social Security
program under our four-factor analysis? Problems would begin with
escapability, because (as we have seen) "nearly .. . all citizens" must
work.231 A retirement-account mandate would also involve much the
same measure of invasiveness as the ACA's minimum coverage provision. In particular, the former-just like the latter-would require
substantial cash outlays for later-to-be-realized contingent financial
payouts, which the worker might well not want to buy. To be sure,
such a law would involve transactional relatedness because employees
would have to make contributions to retirement accounts only so long
as they worked. 232 On the other hand, paying for retirement benefits
might be seen as having only a limited functional relatedness because
the post-work nature of the benefit may distance paying for it from
the act of working itself. In particular, the connection between the
triggering act (working) and the mandate (paying for post-workingage benefits) may be seen as involving far less relatedness than (for
example) our miners-must-wear-helmets-while-mining law. 2 33
See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2644 (joint dissent). See generally supra notes 90, 207 and accompanying text (noting this practical reality).
232 Moreover, this fact might create a functional point of distinction from the ACA case.
According to this argument, the Court in NFIB confronted a mandate that applied on an ongoing basis throughout one's lifetime. A mandate tied to a wholly privatized Social Security system, however, would operate only for those periods during which the individual actually worked.
In the view of at least some judges, this difference might matter on the theory that a mandate
that operates only so long as an individual works is marked by a self-limiting proportionality.
See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2591 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) ("The Commerce Clause is not a general
license to regulate an individual from cradle to grave .... ); Florida v. U.S. Dep't of Health &
Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1313 (11th Cir. 2011) (expressing concern that the mandate extends "for the entire duration of [Americans'] lives"), affd in part and rev'd in part sub nom.
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). One difficulty with this argument, however, is that many adults in
fact work on a continuous basis. Another problem is that the minimum coverage provision itself
was tied to the production of income and thus could be seen as effectively tied to working. See
supra notes 86, 90 and accompanying text.
233 Indeed, the minimum coverage provision had a measure of functional relatedness to
earning a specified income that buying retirement protection does not have to working in an
office or factory. This is so because, whereas securing health insurance tends to facilitate work
by those who have employment, see supra note 208 and accompanying text, it is not clear why
paying for retirement benefits helps to ensure that workers show up and work more productively
on a daily basis.
230
231
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Policy sensitivity cuts both ways. The long-term success of the
Social Security system in providing a basic quality of life for retirees
signals the value of maintaining some form of mandatory retirement
contribution program. And there may be much to be said for privatization because private-market forces could discipline service providers, generate higher returns, and give the entire system a self-funding
quality that it lacks today. 234 On the other hand, privatizing the system would create new risks that retirement benefits might be lost or
compromised as a result of poor investment decisions made by individuals or their private fund managers. Privatization critics are sure to
say that this possibility would rob the Social Security system of the
dependability that has been its hallmark quality for the past eighty

years.2 3 5
The cloudy constitutional picture presented by the proposed
privatization of Social Security is made cloudier still because privatization efforts could take other, more complex forms. Congress, for example, might give workers a private-contribution option while
keeping the existing program in place for those who prefer it. It might
also structure such an optional program in a way that renders the use
of private retirement accounts particularly attractive, or that defaults
workers into private plans rather than the traditional public-system
alternative. Such hybridized programs would present distinct constitutional problems, particularly as to how tax-based and non-tax-based
retirement-funding systems relate to each other for purposes of legislative-power analysis. 23 6 The key point is that any effort to privatize

234 E.g., Graetz & Mashaw, supra note 12, at 309. For further development of this idea and
related matters, see generally Michael J. Graetz & Jerry L. Mashaw, Constitutional Uncertainty
and the Design of Social Insurance: Reflections on the Obamacare Case, 7 HARV. L. & POL'Y
REV. 343 (2013).
235 See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., Social Security Scares, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 5, 2004, at
A23 (highlighting the dependability of Social Security); see also THE DEMOCRATIC NAT'L
COMM., MOVING AMERICA FORWARD: 2012 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL PLATFORM, available at
http://assets.dstatic.org/dnc-platform/2012-National-Platform.pdf ("[W]e will find a solution to
protect Social Security for future generations. We will block Republican efforts to subject
Americans' guaranteed retirement income to the whims of the stock market through
privatization.").
236 Perhaps courts would deem quasi-privatization permissible under the commerce power
because making private agreements would not be "compelled" in light of the option to remain in
the government program. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2591 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (describing the
minimum coverage provision, for commerce power purposes, as bringing about a "compelled
purchase"). On the other hand, courts could reject this argument by characterizing the program
as "creating" private commerce, even if it does not "compel" such commerce. See supra note 33
and accompanying text.
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the Social Security system will present new and troublesome complexities in the wake of NFIB.23 7
Moreover, the constitutional difficulties that now surround Social
Security privatization efforts may also come to bear on other reforms
to government benefit programs. In recent years, for example,
thoughtful scholars have urged Congress to take a fresh look at unemployment compensation. In particular, they suggest that the nation's
existing hodge-podge of state-run unemployment compensation systems should be scrapped in favor of a centralized federal program that
would (among other things) mandate that workers fund retirement
and unemployment compensation accounts that are linked. 238 Such a
move, they claim, would spread the costs of unemployment far more
efficiently than is the case today, while also dampening program beneficiaries' incentives to free-ride on government largess. 2 39 This sweeping reform proposal has much to commend it. NFIB, however, may
stop it dead in its tracks. 24 0 The basic difficulty is that a mandate to set
up these accounts (at least if they are to be established with private
financial services firms) smacks of a command to purchase an "un-

wanted product." 2 41
This discussion of potential unemployment compensation reforms
provides a reminder that economic and social problems continuously
push thoughtful policy makers to fashion innovative programs designed to bring together the separate energies of private markets and
237 See Graetz & Mashaw, supra note 12, at 308-10 (arguing that mandatory retirement
accounts would be unconstitutional under the commerce power after NFIB); Aziz Huq, In the
HealthcareDecision, a Hidden Threat?, NATION (June 29, 2012), http://www.thenation.com/article/168677/healthcare-decision-hidden-threat (declaring that "a federal mandate to purchase a
private retirement account" is "now out of bounds, at least under the Commerce Clause"); Paul
Starr, Supreme Surprise, AM. PROSPECT (June 29, 2012), http://prospect.org/article/supreme-surprise (noting that a ruling against the government in NFIB under both the commerce and taxing
powers could have doomed Social Security privatization); Steven Teles, Roberts' Health Care
Decision: Statesmanship, Not Jurisprudence, SCOTUSREPORT (July 12, 2012, 1:04 PM), http://
www.scotusreport.com/2012/07/12/roberts-health-care-decision-statesmanship-not-jurisprudencel (suggesting that "mandatory privatized Social Security accounts" would face additional
hurdles after the NFIB decision). Of particular significance, because other nations' pension systems involve contractual mandates, see Graetz & Mashaw, supra note 12, at 304, any new reforms modeled after these systems will face problems under NFIB.
238 See Graetz & Mashaw, supra note 12, at 310-12 (making the case for a system of individual accounts).
239 See id. at 311-12 (suggesting that forced reductions to these linked accounts to help
replace lost wages during periods of unemployment, and the resulting loss of future retirement
income, would discourage free-riding on government-paid-for unemployment benefits).
240 See id. at 312 (stating that this reform would have to be implemented under the taxing
power, presumably because NFIB prevents such enactment under the commerce power).
241 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2586 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
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government controls. 2 4 2 It also makes a point of enduring significance:
Even the most far-reaching and consequential of these programs may
face constitutional obstacles in the wake of NFIB.243
V.

OTHER LOOMING MANDATE PROBLEMS

The foregoing discussion leaves no doubt that many real-world
issues lie in the train of the Court's treatment of the commerce power
in the health care case. Even the many issues identified so far, however, represent only a limited sampling. Consider the following:
1. In NFIB, the Justices saw themselves as evaluating the constitutionality of an "individual mandate."244 Indeed, the term "individual" appears in the opinions of Chief Justice Roberts and the joint
opinion writers no fewer than 220 times. 24 5 This rhetoric raises obvious questions about how the anti-mandate principle applies to organized business entities, particularly corporations. Fans of the principle
may well rely on Citizens United v. FEC24 6 -the Roberts Court's decision second in fame only to NFIB-to argue that, because "corporations are people," 2 47 a commerce power ban on individual mandates
should extend to corporate mandates as well.248 Many counterargu242 Indeed, as many observers in the run-up to the Court's ruling in NFIB noted, the individual mandate originally was "the brainchild of conservative economists" who sought to address market failures in the healthcare field with a blend of government and private-industry
involvement. See N.C. Aizenman, Provision at Center of Debate Was a Republican Idea, WASH.

PosT, Mar. 26, 2012, at A7 (adding that "[t]he individual insurance mandate ...

was . . . em-

braced by some of the nation's most prominent Republicans for nearly two decades").
243 See Eric Randall, What Analysts Are Saying: Roberts to the Rescue of Liberals, WIRE
(June 28, 2012, 10:31 AM), http://www.thewire.com/politics/2012/06/what-analysts-are-sayingroberts-rescue-liberals/53997/ (quoting Lyle Denniston as arguing that the Commerce Clause rejection is a major blow to Congress's ability to pass social welfare laws).
244 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2587 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (emphasis added). The problem,
the Chief Justice decreed, was that this mandate "compels individuals to become active in commerce," thus reflecting a congressional effort to "regulate individuals precisely because they are
doing nothing." Id. (emphasis added and omitted).
245 See generally id. at 2577-2608; id. at 2642-77 (joint dissent).
246 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
247 See Ashley Parker, "CorporationsAre People," Romney Tells Iowa Hecklers Angry over
His Tax Policy, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 12, 2011, at A16 (quoting presidential candidate as saying:
"Corporations are people, my friend."); Ross Ramsey, Court Stays the Course on Politics and
Business, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2012, at A19A (expressing the view that "[t]he 'corporations are
people' movement got a boost this week when the nation's highest court reasserted a two-yearold ruling allowing corporations to pay for political ads").
248 Professor Pushaw, for example, seems to conclude that some laws aimed at "forcing
sellers to deal with customers" would be unsustainable under the commerce power. Robert J.
Pushaw, Jr., ObamaCareand the OriginalMeaning of the Commerce Clause: Identifying Historical Limits on Congress'sPowers, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1703, 1740 n.231 (suggesting in particular
that, though the 1964 Civil Rights Act is constitutional because it promotes "a free market in
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ments to this line of analysis are available, including that (1) conducting business (especially in the benefits-generating corporate form)
directly involves "engag[ing] in commerce," rather than "abstain[ing]"
from it,249 and (2) Citizens United focused on considerations specifically tied to the First Amendment, and therefore is of no significance
in measuring the reach of the Commerce and Necessary and Proper
Clauses. 25 0 Even so, some tricky questions about the anti-mandate
principle and business entities will inevitably arise, as the next point
illustrates.
2. Even if the anti-mandate principle is inapplicable to business
entities as a general matter, it may take hold in some circumstances.
In particular, as earlier analysis suggests, the case for applying the
anti-mandate principle gains force as the relation between the condition-triggering activity and the challenged mandate becomes more attenuated. 2 5 1 What if, for example, Congress required all corporations
with more than $10 million in annual revenue to channel at least one
percent of that revenue to firms that qualify as "small service-providing businesses"? At first blush, such a law might seem defensible
under the commerce power in light of the critical role that small firms
play in incubating business activity, decentralizing the delivery of
commercial services, invigorating local communities, fostering entrepreneurship, and the like. 25 2 But just because a firm generates $10
million in annual revenue does not mean that it has entered into the
market for contracting with outside service providers, far less "small
service-providing businesses." As a result, at least in the eyes of the
present-day Court, a resulting lack of relatedness may pose problems
for this conditional mandate. 253 At the least, it remains uncertain how
the relatedness principle will operate as Congress directs a wide variinterstate commerce, undistorted by state practices," such a rationale does not support, for example, federal legislation that forces "ordering motels to rent rooms even to intoxicated
people").
249 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2590 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2599 (majority opinion); see,
e.g., Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 753 F. Supp. 2d 611, 636 (W.D. Va. 2010) (indicating that
Congress can direct minimum wage and other worker-benefiting laws, including purported mandates, at business operators because those "[e]mployers ... are already engaged in commerce").
250 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 339, 343 (determining that a "prohibition on corporate
independent expenditures is ... a ban on speech" and concluding "that political speech of corporations ... should [not] be treated differently [than the political speech of individuals] under the
First Amendment").
251 See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
252 See, e.g., George L. Priest, Small Business, Economic Growth, and the Huffman Conjecture, 7 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 1, 2 (2003).
253 See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
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ety of mandates at corporations and other organized business entities-especially when significant invasiveness and reinforcing policy
sensitivity concerns are present. 254
3. Another problem not addressed in the preceding pages involves the duration of mandates, including mandates directed at corporations. One statute enacted under the commerce power, for
example, requires business owners to provide workers with notice of
the shut-down of a major plant, and thereafter to keep it operating for
at least sixty days. 255 Is this sixty-day rule a mandate, and if so, is it
valid? What if Congress substituted a plant-operation requirement of
one year? Six years? Sixteen years? How are such lines to be drawn?
4. A related temporal problem concerns mandates that are triggered by actions that occurred before the mandate-imposing statute
was enacted. 256 Congress, for example, relied on the commerce power
to justify many applications of the high-profile Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act ("SORNA"). 25 7 In particular, SORNA mandates that persons who previously committed federal sex crimessuch as crossing a state line to sexually abuse a child-notify authorities whenever they relocate (including within a state) following their
release from incarceration. 2 58 Although SORNA reaches persons who
committed their offenses and were released prior to the law's effective
date, the Court has indicated that this retroactive operation of the
statute does not offend the Ex Post Facto Clause. 259 Perhaps, how254 See supra notes 65, 72, 157 and accompanying text (noting questions raised by others
about the post-NFIB constitutionality of antidiscrimination laws and pollution regulations applicable to business operators).
255 See 29 U.S.C. § 2102(a)(1) (2012).
256 See Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 560 (6th Cir. 2011) (raising question whether Congress could have imposed the ACA individual mandate under the commerce
power on persons who had previously maintained coverage for a limited period, perhaps even
prior to the ACA's enactment), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 61 (2012), overruled in part by NFIB, 132
S. Ct. 2566 (2012); see also Weiner, supra note 10, at 76 (posing several questions about temporal
problems presented by NFIB, including: "[I]f an individual enters the healthcare market, is she
in it forever?").
257 Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901-16991
(2012); see United States v. Guzman, 591 F.3d 83, 89-91 (2d Cir. 2010) (relying on the Commerce Clause to uphold SORNA's registration clause and collecting cases upholding other parts
of SORNA under that grant of power).
258 See 42 U.S.C. § 16913. See generally United States v. Lott, 912 F. Supp. 2d 146, 155 (D.
Vt. 2012) (discussing the potential for characterizing the SORNA registration requirement as a
mandate, on the theory that, like the ACA, it is violated by a "failure to take an affirmative
act").
259 See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105-06 (2003) (finding no Ex Post Facto Clause violation
in retroactive application of Alaska's analogous Sex Offender Registration Act); see also United
States v. Felts, 674 F.3d 599, 605-06 (6th Cir. 2012) (applying Smith in upholding the federal sex
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ever, retroactive application of SORNA now violates the anti-mandate principle of NFIB. In that case, after all, Chief Justice Roberts
signaled that Congress could direct mandates only at persons who are
"currently engaged in . . . commercial activity." 260 And that descrip-

tion does not comfortably fit someone whose relevant commercial activity (for example, crossing a state line to commit a sex crime)
occurred decades ago, long before Congress passed SORNA. It is unclear how courts will handle these commerce-before-enactment
cases. 26 1 But a recent decision suggests that the anti-mandate principle may give new hope to challengers of backward-reaching applications of SORNA, and other federal statutes as well. 262
offender statute against Ex Post Facto Clause challenge and collecting other cases reaching the
same result).
260 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2590 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (emphasis added); see also
id. at 2586 ("The power to regulate commerce presupposes the existence of commercial activity
to be regulated." (emphasis omitted)); United States v. Rose, 714 F.3d 362, 371 (6th Cir. 2013)
(suggesting that mandates can be placed only on one who "is actively engaged in an economic
class of activities").
261 See, e.g., United States v. Cabrera-Gutierrez, 718 F.3d 873, 879 (9th Cir. 2013) (rejecting
NFIB-based challenge to SORNA because "SORNA does not regulate individuals precisely because they are doing nothing"; rather, "registration is required only of those individuals who,
through being criminally charged and convicted, have placed themselves in a category of persons
who pose a specific danger to society" (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v.
Sterling Centrecorp Inc., 960 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1053 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (worrying about a result
under which CERCLA would "be unconstitutional where an owner's only activity is to purchase
land"-apparently including where the purchase occurred before CERCLA's enactment-because "no court has ever suggested that an owner of contaminated property cannot be compelled
to assist in its cleanup").
262 The case is United States v. Kebodeaux, 133 S. Ct. 2496 (2013). In it, the Court dealt
with the application of SORNA's registration requirement in a situation where the Act took
effect long after a former military service member had finished serving his time for an earliercommitted sex offense. See id. at 2505. The government argued that this application of SORNA
was permissible under the Necessary and Proper Clause, coupled with Congress's enumerated
power "[t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces." U.S.
CONsr. art. 1. § 8, cl. 14. In sustaining the government's position, however, the Court emphasized that SORNA's reach-back to pre-enactment activity was not objectionable, because this
particular service member already had an expansive duty-which arose out of his service activity
under the separate Wetterling Act, which existed at the time of his earlier offenses-to report on
his location, wholly apart from the operation of SORNA. See Kebodeaux, 133 S. Ct. at 2502.
Kebodeaux thus leaves open the possibility that the Court in the future will invalidate registration mandates applied to sex offenders based on pre-SORNA (as opposed to post-SORNA)
crimes, including crimes established by statutes enacted under the Commerce Clause, to the
extent that the Wetterling Act is inapplicable. See Steven Schwinn, Opinion Analysis: A Modest
Ruling, or Vast FederalAuthority?, SCOTUSBLOG (June 24, 2013, 6:13 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/opinion-analysis-a-modest-ruling-or-vast-federal-authority/ (noting NFIB's potential application in this situation, that the Court "dodged that question [in Kebodeaux]," and
that Kebodeaux will "provide fodder to both sides in the ongoing debate[] over the scope of
congressional authority"). But cf United States v. Howell, 552 F.3d 709, 713-17 (8th Cir. 2009)
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5. As the preceding paragraphs suggest, some federal mandates
may give rise to "as applied" constitutional challenges. 263 Consider
the law that mandates airport screenings, which are now so invasive
that they can reveal images of one's genitals or force a passenger to
submit to a pat-down of the entire body.264 At first blush, such a
screening seems distinguishable from the compelled purchase of insurance because airport users actively engage in commerce when they
choose to fly. For some targets of airport screening mandates, however, this depiction turns out to be strained. They may be headed for
planes only because the government itself compelled the journey-for
example, by subpoenaing the individual to appear as a witness halfway
across the country-or they may not be passengers at all. Consider
local fire department employees. Can the federal government subject
them to mandatory screenings before they enter gate areas to conduct
state-required fire safety inspections? The answer may prove to be
yes. If that is so, however, it probably will not be because these individuals have voluntarily opted into federally mandated electronic strip
searches simply by choosing to become local firefighters. In such
cases, will courts reason that the Necessary and Proper Clause permits
a measure of overinclusiveness to avoid administrative problems in
the mandate's operation? Will they address concerns about escapability, relatedness, intrusiveness, and policy sensitivity on a caseby-case basis, or by looking at the mandate's most common applications? In the end, the answers to these questions will hinge on how
aggressively the Justices choose to apply the anti-mandate principle.
6. A final post-NFIB puzzle involves how the anti-mandate
principle applies to state governments. One federal law based on the
commerce power, for example, mandates that states negotiate with
Native American tribes about forming gambling-related compacts. 265
Another mandates that state and local authorities supply information
about missing children to the Federal Department of Justice. 266 It may
be that these laws do not run afoul of the anticommandeering princi(reasoning that retroactively imposed registration requirements based on intrastate movements
is a necessary and proper means of helping to effectuate a separate and permissible mandate to
report interstate relocation).
263 See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
264 See 49 C.F.R. § 1540.107 (2013) (requiring passengers to submit to screenings); Tom
Cohen, Enhanced Pat-Downs Necessary for Now, TSA Chief Says, CNN.com (Nov. 21, 2010,
8:22 PM), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-11-21/travel/tsa.pat.downs 1_pat-down-screening-explosives (summarizing highly invasive screenings).
265 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A) (2012).
266 42 U.S.C. § 5779(a) (2012).
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ple of Printz v. United States.267 In particular, a court might reason
that these provisions (unlike in Printz) do not compel the state to "administer or enforce a federal regulatory program" aimed at controlling
private persons;268 rather, they simply impose federal-law duties directly on state governments themselves. These laws, however, do
mandate that states take action-to enter into negotiations in one case
and to transmit information in the other-thereby potentially bringing
the anti-mandate principle of NFIB into play. 2 69 To be sure, states are
not individuals. But they are also not corporations voluntarily established by profit-seeking groups of persons for the very purpose of pursuing commercial ventures. The uncertain application of the antimandate principle to state governments exemplifies the mix of knotty
problems that NFIB has brought to the fore.
VI.

THE FUTURE OF THE ANTI-MANDATE PRINCIPLE

The foregoing discussion points to a wide range of possible applications of the new anti-mandate principle set forth in NFIB. As that
discussion shows, future deployments of this principle are likely to focus on two questions: Does the law establish a mandate, and if so,
should courts invalidate that mandate in light of considerations of escapability, relatedness, invasiveness, and policy sensitivity? To recognize these forces in our law is to take an important first step. But that
step takes us only so far.
The reason why is that the judicial choices about how to apply
constitutional decision rules inevitably hinge on such forces in the law
as institutional considerations, methodological approaches, and background values reflected in earlier rulings. These drivers will dictate
whether courts come to take a broad approach or a narrow approach,
or something in between, as they grapple with applying NFIB's antimandate norm. As a general matter, however, four reasons suggest
that judges should act with great caution when called on to invalidate
acts of Congress under this new limiting principle.
First, the majority's view of congressional power in NFIB pushed
a constitutional edge. 270 To begin with, the individual mandate was
one component of a program designed to address the sort of systemic

268

Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
Id. at 935.

269

See Senne v. Vill. of Palatine, 695 F.3d 617, 620 (7th Cir. 2012) (noting that prohibition

267

on disclosing driver information does not implicate NFIB because "[h]ere, there is no instance of
the federal government forcing a state or an individual to participate in an interstate market").
270 See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
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market failure that the Court had permitted Congress to deal with in
the past.27 1 In addition, the Court's ruling rubbed up hard against the
idea that Congress can stabilize the national economy by implementing social welfare programs in ways that sensibly blend federal, state,
and private market participation. 272 Finally, the ruling in NFIB confronted serious difficulties under the originalist methodology. I have
covered this ground elsewhere. 273 But among the critical points are
these: The ratifying community well understood the "[s]weeping"
power that the Necessary and Proper Clause gave Congress to address
then-unforeseen problems that were national in character. 274 For this
reason, antifederalist critics of the Constitution pushed hard to
counteract its empowerment of the Federal Congress. 275 Their strategy for doing so, however, centered on crafting a Bill of Rights, as
opposed to narrowing the reach of the Necessary and Proper Clause
itself. Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that an early Congress enacted an individual mandate that required citizens to secure
guns and ammunition. 276 This law comported with Publius's earlier
insistence in The Federalist No. 23 that the Necessary and Proper
Clause vests in Congress a power "to pass all laws"-thus including
mandates-"which have relation to" its military powers.277 But Publius went further than that, emphasizing that "[t]he same must be the
271 See, e.g., Fried,supra note 12, at 52 ("[Slince 1937 the Court had not come even close to
invalidating on Commerce Clause grounds a statute that was without question one of economic
regulation."); see also Strauss, supra note 16, at 2 (noting that "in a highly integrated economy,
anything important enough to attract Congress's attention is likely to be connected, in a meaningful way, to interstate commerce").
272 See Pushaw & Nelson, supra note 9, at 994 ("National Federationis truly pathbreaking
because it is the only case since 1936 in which the Court has found that a non-trivial law fell
outside the scope of Congress's Commerce Power.").
273 See generally Dan T. Coenen, Originalismand the "Individual Mandate": Rounding Out
the Government's Case for Constitutionality, 107 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 55, 60-64 (2012),
available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2012/10/LRColl2012nO
Coenen.pdf (outlining "six separate elements of the framing history" that are "at odds" with the
challenge leveled at the individual mandate); Coenen, OriginalistCase, supra note 90, at 36-45
(discussing the defects in the "it's-not-proper argument"). But see Richard A. Epstein, A Most
Improbable 1787 Constitution: A (Mostly) Originalist Critique of the Constitutionality of the
ACA, in THE HEALTH CARE CASE, supra note 10, at 28, 32-37 (criticizing the ACA on originalist grounds).
274 THE FEDERALIST No. 33, at 203 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
275 See, e.g., John T. Valauri, The Clothes Have No Emperor, or, Cabining the Commerce
Clause, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 405, 429 (2004).
276 Militia Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 33, § 1, 1 Stat. 271 (repealed 1903); see Hall,supra note
17, at 1856 (discussing this early mandate).
277 THE FEDERALIST No. 23, at 155 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(emphasis added).
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case, in respect to commerce, and to every other matter to which its
jurisdiction is permitted to extend." 27 8 The Framers also envisioned
that Congress could invoke the Necessary and Proper Clause to wield
the same range of implementary powers that were available to the
state legislatures, again including the power to impose mandates. 27 9
All of this history suggests at least that courts should apply with great
circumspection the anti-mandate principle established in NFIB.
Second, the Court's holding in NFIB ultimately hinged on its conclusion that the individual mandate was not a "proper" exercise of the
Necessary and Proper Clause. 2 80 Never before in the history of the
Court had it invoked this distinctively opaque text to strike down a
law directed at private persons, as opposed to states as states. 281 And
that pattern of decisionmaking was hardly surprising. Put simply,
courts should apply any anti-mandate principle narrowly for the same
reason that they always have hesitated to invalidate federal laws on
the ground they are not "proper." Otherwise, as Professor Randy
Beck has observed, the Constitution will serve as "an empty glass into
which one may pour whatever social, economic or political theory one
desires." 28 2 Indeed, this Article should serve to bring this point home.
It demonstrates that the anti-mandate principle has created many stillbelow-the-radar opportunities to challenge federal laws, including
laws of longstanding and far-reaching importance. Consequently, unless that principle is given only a narrow compass of operation, it will
threaten much disruption of our existing legal order while impeding
efforts to bring improvement to critical federal programs.
Third, a disinclination to apply special limits to so-called "mandates" will hardly exempt them from constitutional scrutiny. To the
extent that federal laws severely impinge on personal liberties, or
compel speech or the surrender of property, the Bill of Rights stands
Id. (emphasis added).
See THE FEDERALIST No. 16, at 116 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
("The government of the Union, like that of each State, must be able to address itself immediately to the hopes and fears of individuals .... It must, in short, possess all the means, and have a
right to resort to all the methods, of executing the powers with which it is intrusted, that are
possessed and exercised by the governments of the particular States." (emphasis added)).
278
279

280

See supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text.

281 See, e.g., Fried, supra note 12, at 56 (noting that before NFIB "[t]he propriety of the
reach has been thought to be a question of whether the claim bumps up against an explicit or
implicit constitutional barrier").
282 J. Randy Beck, The New Jurisprudenceof the Necessary and ProperClause, 2002 U. ILL.
L. REV. 581, 640; see also Fried,supra note 12, at 57 (describing the new "proprietary" requirement as "dangerous" because it is so "open-ended").
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ready to fend off federal overreaching. 28 3 In addition, pre-NFIB commerce power law provides avenues for constraining federal legislative
authority. To be sure, in keeping with the Framers' intentions, the
Court has long deferred to congressional judgments about the compatibility of federal economic controls with the commerce power.284
But this deference has never been total, and the modern Court has
blocked federal overreaches without the need to apply any anti-mandate principle.285 In short, already recognized means of policing federal abuses blunt the need for sweeping application of the commerce
power holding of NFIB.
Finally, the Court itself signaled the propriety of a go-slow approach even as it concluded that Congress had exceeded its commerce
power in the health care case. Of particular importance, the Justices
highlighted the historical singularity of the individual mandate. 286 The
idea was conveyed in part by their repeated emphasis of the distinctive features that marked this law: It was directed at individuals-indeed, at "nearly . . . every citizen" of the nation;287 it compelled
entirely new commerce as a tool for effectuating otherwise-hard-toimplement regulations of already existing commerce; 288 it mandated
the making of an "unwanted contract" (as opposed, for example, to
simply attaching unwanted terms to contracts that parties were otherwise poised to make);289 it operated in a field traditionally overseen by
the states;290 and it was not irreplaceable in that other means were
See U.S.

CONST. amend. I; U.S. CONST. amend. V.
See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 729 (1984)
("[S]trong deference [is] accorded legislation in the field of national economic policy .... ); see
also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 570-74 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (providing a
history of the Court's deferential approach to congressional judgment as to economic
regulation).
285 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 598-99 (2000) (invalidating a law
subjecting private parties to suit for gender-motivated violence because such action is
"noneconomic in nature"); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68 (invalidating a ban on possession of firearms in or near a school).
286 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2586 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (noting the
"[1]egislative novelty" of the individual mandate); see also supra notes 97-98 and accompanying
text (noting other similar descriptions).
287 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2644 (joint dissent).
288 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
289 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2586 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (condemning laws "compel[ling]
individuals not engaged in commerce to purchase an unwanted product"); id. at 2648 n.2 (joint
dissent) (describing the ACA as "mandating the purchase of an unwanted suite of products"); id.
at 2649 n.3 (refuting "the power to compel purchase of unwanted goods").
290 Id. at 2591 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.); see Fried, supra note 12, at 56 (claiming that the
"Chief Justice reached for the notion that the extension was improper ... because there was
something particularly inappropriate about this reach, and that was found in the notion that the
283
284
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available to Congress to pursue its underlying regulatory objectives. 291
These features and others resulted in descriptions of the individual
mandate as a "novel"2 9 2 and "extraordinary" 293 innovation that Congress had "never before used." 294 Nor did this limiting language come
out of the blue. It was crafted against a backdrop of judicial pronouncements, dating back to the days of Chief Justice Marshall, suggestive of the need for courts to defer to congressional choices in
overseeing the national economy. 295 Especially in light of this history,
the majority's repeated focus on the "unprecedented" character of the
minimum coverage provision carries with it an important message. 2 9 6
It signals that the Court's fractionated ruling on the commerce power
issue was not itself meant to supply a precedent for a sweeping new
constraint on congressional authority.
CONCLUSION

The decisions of courts, Walter Oberer once wrote, create "tools"
more so than "rules." 297 This observation applies with special force to
the work of the United States Supreme Court, which must be translated by lower courts in every corner of the nation as "facts permute
infinitely." 2 98 This Article suggests that the Court's treatment of the
commerce power in NFIB offers a new tool for creative lawyers to use
as they strive to scale back the scope of federal legislative authority.
The opportunities for putting that tool to work are wide-ranging.
They reach across antidiscrimination bans to health-treatment reregulation of medical systems and practice was a particular and traditional realm of state
responsibility").
291 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2647 (joint dissent) ("[T]here are many ways other than [the]
Individual Mandate by which the regulatory scheme's goals of reducing insurance premiums and
ensuring the profitability of insurers could be achieved. For instance, those who did not
purchase insurance could be subjected to a surcharge when they do enter the health insurance
system. Or they could be denied a full income tax credit given to those who do purchase the
insurance."); see also Weiner, supra note 10, at 79 (noting that the joint dissenters argued that
the individual mandate was not the only practical way to reform the health insurance system).
292 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2599.
293 Id. at 2592 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
294 Id. at 2649 (joint dissent).
295 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196-97 (1824) (reasoning that the commerce power is "plenary," that it "may be exercised to its utmost extent," and that the "sole
restraints" of its abuse lie in "[t]he wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their identity with the
people, and the influence which their constituents possess at elections").
296 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2647-48, 2677 (joint dissent).
297 See Walter E. Oberer, On Law, Lawyering, and Law Professing:The Golden Sand, 39 J.
LEGAL EDUc. 203, 204-05 (1989).
298 See id. at 204.
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quirements to possessory crimes to Kelo-like takings to product-quality rules to union dues payments to privatizing Social Security to sexoffender registration requirements. In each of these contexts, and
others as well, 29 9 courts will have to grapple with NFIB's new antimandate principle. In doing so, they first will have to determine
whether the challenged law imposes a mandate, rather than another
form of legal restriction. And if it does, they will next have to ask
whether it qualifies as the sort of mandate that the Court's ruling in
NFIB disallows. The answer to that question, I have suggested, will
hinge primarily on how escapable the mandate is, how closely it relates to any condition that triggers its operation, how greatly the mandate invades private liberty, and surrounding policy considerations
that cut for and against its operation. In all of this, there is room for
judgment, and different courts will reach different conclusions as they
address down-the-road issues. All courts, however, should tread carefully in putting the anti-mandate principle to use. Of particular importance, the Justices in NFIB emphasized that the individual
mandate was constitutionally vulnerable precisely because it was "unprecedented."300 This reasoning suggests that, while NFIB provides
lawyers with a new tool to wield on behalf of their clients, that tool
was not fashioned by the Court to cut away large swaths of existing
law.

299

See, e.g., Yung, supra note 85, at 858 (also considering, for example, misprision of felony

laws).
300

See supra note 98.

